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CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT: SOME
SENSE OF A HODGEPODGE
LAWRENCE N. GRAY, ESQ.'
INTRODUCTION

In one way or another, the law of contempt permeates all
law because force-not morality-is the ultimate sanction.
Those who will not obey, or disrupt, are to be coerced and punished in the name of the law. In law school, contempt is a word
used frequently but seldom defined beyond a few maxims, such
as something about the key to one's own jail cell. After law
school, contempt becomes a word secretly feared by those who
threaten it-probably as much as those who are threatened with
it. Contempt should be a required course in law school or at
least 90% of any course in professional responsibility.
From a personal perspective as one who has read and
studied contempt for close to thirty years, the latest erroneouslyreasoned decision holds no awe because there is always an inventory of other erroneous decisions available to neutralize its
pontifications about something being "well settled"-leaving the
comparatively precious few classics, which have been soundly
reasoned and correctly decided, free to fix the right. An intramural reassessment should take place on all levels, right up to
the United States Supreme Court. With rare exception, appellate contempt law decisions are of extraordinarily poor quality.
Bearing the marks of hurried carelessness and shockingly poor
judgment, these decisions seem to mix and match truth with
falsity and inaccurately cite or conveniently ignore precedent, re1 Special thanks to Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco for his support and encouragement. All rights reserved by the author. Permission to republish will be
granted per written request. This article is dedicated to the memory of a good person and a good trial judge-the Honorable Ruth Moskowitz, Justice of the Supreme
Court, Kings County. Privately, routinely-and certainly out of her earshot but with
respect and affection-she was referred to as "Ruthie" by those who always bore the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in her courtroom. She is certainly
missed.
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sulting in a virtual jurisprudence by nomenclature.2 This article
is one man's effort to capture the essence of contempt law and
pass it on to his brothers and sisters in comprehensible form-as
far as that which is written will permit.
SECTION 1: CONTEMPT GENERALLY

Anglo-Saxon courts of justice are vested, by the very act of
their creation, with the "power to impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates," and to protect the integrity of their proceedings and their
officers from disruption and corruption! Historically, English

and American courts have possessed this inherent authority to
punish parties for contempt as of the moment they were constituted.4 When the judiciary exercises its inherent contempt
power, it vindicates its authority and therefore its existence as

See International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821 (1994) (paralleling civil and criminal contempt crimes that aren't "serious" and
distinguishing them from "serious" criminal contempt crimes); United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 688-90 (1993); McCormick v. Axelrod, 453 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y.
1984) (per curiam) (holding the Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Health, a nursing home, and its administrator in contempt for violating terms of a
stay order precluding discharge of residents pending a hearing and the determination of appeal); People v. Leone, 376 N.E.2d 1287, 1288 (N.Y. 1978) (per curiam)
(refusing to dismiss defendant's indictment of criminal contempt absent statutory
authority despite the fact that he later complied with the court order that he had
originally disobeyed); People v. Johnson, 649 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1996) (holding
that since the defendant was charged with violating the Judiciary Law rather than
the Penal Law, all that was required was a hearing and an opportunity to defend);
Kuriansky v. Ali, 574 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (App. Div. 1991) (upholding a criminal contempt petition while acknowledging that the Attorney General should not have instituted a contempt proceeding until after moving to compel compliance); Additional
Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Sup. Ct. v. Doe, 444 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (App. Div.
1981) (affirming conviction for contempt, but holding that by appealing and testifying before a grand jury after the contempt order was entered, the offender purged
the contempt); Ferrara v. Hynes, 404 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (App. Div. 1978) (upholding
conviction of witness for contempt, but allowing the witness to purge himself by undoing the acts that caused the contempt).
3Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
227 (1821)).
4 See Philip A. Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine Workers v.
Bagwell: A ParadigmShift in the DistinctionBetween Civil and Criminal Contempt,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 181, 186-87 (1995) (discussing the broad and long-enjoyed contempt power of English courts); see also Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324,
325-26 (1904); Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) (stating that the
courts' inherent power to punish for contempt developed at the moment of their in2

ception).
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an institution of separated government.' Ancillary to the exercise of this inherent contempt power is the punishment or modification of behavior for the benefit of either the public generally
or private suitors individually. Contrary to some inaccurate
statements made by a myriad of American courts ranging from

the "milk stool" to America's highest, statutes regulating the judiciary's inherent contempt power are limitations on, not conferrals of, such power.' While the judiciary's inherent contempt
power is part of its definition as a political institution, its
authority over penal law crimes of contempt is legislatively conferred.' Crimes of contempt are entirely creatures of legislative
enactment. They are conceptual cousins to those inherent powers wielded by courts to vindicate their own authority. The inherent judicial contempt power preserves both the court's
authority and the rights of parties to a lawsuit. Under penal
laws, courts punish contempt crimes just like any other crime,
namely, by imposing a sentence for transgressions of the public's
right to peace, security and good order.'
6 See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) (citing
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,450 (1911)).
6 Criminal ("public") contempt proceedings are utilized "to preserve the power
and vindicate the dignity of the courts and to punish for disobedience of their orders." Bessette, 194 U.S. at 328 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 458 (8th Cir.
1902)). Civil ("private") contempt proceedings are "instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and decrees." Id.; see also People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 4 N.E. 259,
260 (N.Y. 1886) (distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt in New York
State courts).
7 See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780-81 (1996)
(noting that
the inherent judiciary power may be limited by statute or rule to prevent the danger
of overreaching); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1941) (pointing out that
Congress had statutorily imposed a limit on the power to punish for contempt and
that federal courts improperly expanded such limitations); Munsell, 4 N.E. at 261-62
(recognizing that statutory language is all-inclusive for criminal contempts but civil
contempts are not limited to the statutory enumeration); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian,
489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (App. Div. 1985) (stating that "[tihe power to punish for
criminal contempt is strictly circumscribed," but the power to punish for civil contempt is "much broader").
See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924). In New York State, statutory law limits the
inherent contempt power of the courts to certain enumerated offenses, and to certain forms and degrees of punishment. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750(A) (McKinney
1992) (imposing limitations on the criminal contempt power); id. § 753(A) (imposing
limitations on the civil contempt power).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50 (McKinney 1988) (designating conduct that
constitutes second degree criminal contempt); id. § 215.51 (defining criminal contempt in the first degree).
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SECTION 2: LEGISLATIVE INHERENT CONTEMPT POWER

The bedrock case from the United States Supreme Court,
Anderson v. Dunn, which recognized the existence of the legislative inherent contempt power, is replete with dicta recognizing
the judiciary's inherent contempt power. 0 It upheld a legislative
contempt issuing out of the United States House of Representatives, with one of the protagonists being the great compromiser,
Henry Clay." The decision astutely recognized and confirmed
the judiciary's inherent contempt power as the "older" Siamese
twin of the inherent legislative contempt power and, consequently, it is cited repeatedly as confirmation of both. Besides
the mutuality of benefit visited on both institutions of constitutional government, repeated citation of the Court's decision-as
Blackstone might have said-lends it the quality of that which
has been settled since "time whereof the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary." The decision is here synopsized:
[The contempt power] must be derived from implication, and the
genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of

implied powers. Had the faculties of man been competent to the
framing of a system of government which would have left nothing to implication, it cannot be doubted, that the effort would
have been made by the framers of the [Clonstitution. But what
is the fact? There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument, a grant of powers which does not draw after it others, not
expressed, but vital to their exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate.
The idea is utopian that government can exist without leaving

the exercise of discretion somewhere. Public security against
the abuse of such discretion must rest on responsibility, and
stated appeal to public approbation ....
But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the practical application of government, it is that the

public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them. The interests and
dignity of those who created them, require the exertion of the
10 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) (acknowledging that
although courts receive the power to punish for contempt through statute, the absence of such a statute does not limit the court's power to punish).
" See id. at 234-35.
12 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 325 (Justin
Kaplan ed., Little, Brown
and Co. 16th ed. 1992).
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powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their
creation. Nor is a casual conflict with the rights of the particular individuals any reason to be urged against the exercise of
such powers. The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the
fate which awaits him and yet it is no less certain, that the laws
under which he suffers were made for his security. The unreasonable murmurs of individuals against the restraints of society,
have a direct tendency to produce that worst of all despotisms,
which makes every individual the tyrant over his neighbour's
rights.
That "the safety of the people is the supreme law," not only
comports with, but is indispensable to, the exercise of those
powers in their public functionaries without which that safety
cannot be guarded. On this principle it is, that Courts of justice
are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in
their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and,
as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and
their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.
It is true that the Courts of justice of the United States are
vested, by express statute provision, with power to fine and imprison for contempts; but it does not follow, from this circumstance, that they would not have exercised that power without
the aid of the statute, or not, in cases, if such should occur, to
which such statute provision may not extend; on the contrary, it
is a legislative assertion of this right, as incidental to a grant of
judicial power, and can only be considered either as an instance
of abundant caution, or a legislative declaration, that the power
of punishing for contempt shall not extend beyond its known
and acknowledged limits of fine and imprisonment.*3
New York's Legislature has inherent contempt powers upon
which limitations are statutorily imposed.'4 The legislature's
19 U.S. at 225-28.
Keeler v. McDonald, 2 N.E. 615, 623-25 (N.Y. 1885) (discussing the inherent powers possessed by the New York State Legislature). Article 2 of New York's
Legislative Law provides the following:
Each house may punish by imprisonment not extending beyond the same
session ... as ... a contempt... the following offenses only:
(1) Arresting a member or officer of either house in violation of his
privilege from arrest;
(2) Disorderly conduct of its members, officers or others in the immediate view and presence of the house, tending to interrupt its proceedings;
(3) The publication of a false and malicious report of its proceedings,
'" Anderson,

14See
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contempt power is reviewable by the courts but not dependent
upon them. 5
SECTION 3: NEW YORK JUDICIARY CONTEMPT POWER
A court lacking the power to coerce obedience to its orders,
or to punish disobedience of them, is a contradiction in terms.
Contempt power is what distinguishes a court from an adminis-16
trative tribunal. A court without contempt power is not a court.
Judicial contempt power, which is nondelegable"7 and exercisable
only in open court,"8 has two facets-criminal or public, and civil

or of the conduct of a member in his legislative capacity;
(4) Giving or offering a bribe to a member, or attempting ... directly or
indirectly, to influence a member in giving or withholding his vote, or
in not attending meetings of the house of which he is a member;
(5) Neglect to attend or be examined as a witness before the house or
committee thereof, or upon reasonable notice to produce any material
... or documents when duly required to give testimony or to produce ...
[the same] ... in a legislative proceeding ... or investigation.
N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1991) (enumerating those contempt offenses for
which either House may punish by imprisonment). It is important to note, however,
that subsection (3) is, for most intents and purposes, unconstitutional. See Groppi v.
Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502 (1972); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941).
11 See, e.g., Groppi, 404 U.S. at 496 (reviewing the contempt power of the Wisconsin State Assembly); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) (examining the
contempt power of the Senate); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917)
(distinguishing between Congress's impeachment power and its inherent power of
contempt); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) (reviewing the inherent
contempt power of the House of Representatives); Doyle v. Hofstader, 177 N.E. 489,
490-91 (N.Y. 1931) (reviewing the legality of a contempt holding, by a joint committee of the New York State Senate and Assembly, of a witness for refusing to testify
before that committee); Keeler, 2 N.E. at 615 (reviewing the legality of the Senate's
imprisonment of a witness for refusing to testify before a public works committee).
'6 The Japanese courts have no contempt powers and thus are actually administrative tribunals. See, e.g., K. WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 225
(1989).
17 See Goldberg v. Extraordinary Special Grand Juries Onondaga County,
418
N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (App. Div. 1979) (holding invalid a judicial order delegating contempt power to members of a special prosecutor's office); People ex rel. Stearns v.
Marr, 84 N.Y.S. 965, 967 (App. Div. 1903), affd in part, 74 N.E. 431 (1905) (stating
that it is for the court to determine whether a person is guilty of contempt).
18See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1948) (stating that a criminal contempt hearing held in secrecy is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 697 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that a civil contempt hearing that
could result in an order of confinement must be publicly held). See generally Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 399 N.E.2d 518 (N.Y. 1979)
(explaining that any public right of access to court proceedings must be balanced
with the rights of the accused); People v. Jones, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (N.Y. 1979)
(emphasizing a right to a public criminal trial).

1998]

CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT

or private. 9 A criminal contempt of court violates the public's
rights generally since the court serves as the public's instrument
of justice. Judicial authority, in the form of criminal contempt

power, is vindicated through punishment and fines."

Civil con-

tempt, however, violates the rights of civil litigants in a purely
private capacity. Here, coercive imprisonment, fines, or monetary indemnity serve to repair the private damage caused by
disobedience to a court's order.21
A criminal contempt may occur within or without a court's
immediate view and presence. Aside from directing colorful epithets toward the court while it is in open session, there are
countless ways to commit an "immediate - view - and - presence 19 See

Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988) (reviewing the

procedure for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt); see also Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 266 U.S.
42, 64-66 (1924) (distinguishing between the purposes of civil and criminal contempt); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 441 (1910) ("It is not the
fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of [contempt] cases."); McCormick v. Axelrod, 453
N.E.2d 508, 512 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the element which elevates a
contempt from civil to criminal is the level of willfulness with which the conduct is
undertaken); Douglas v. Adel, 199 N.E. 35, 37 (N.Y. 1935) (stating that a criminal
contempt in the "immediate view and presence" of the judge may be punishable
summarily); In re Barnes, 97 N.E. 508, 509-10 (N.Y. 1912) (holding valid a statute
imposing power upon judges to imprison witnesses who fail to appear and testify);
People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 4 N.E. 259, 261-62 (N.Y. 1886)
(distinguishing between criminal contempt, civil contempt, and misdemeanors);
Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that the inherent civil contempt power is significantly broader than the criminal contempt
power).
20 See Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl. Conservation,
513 N.E.2d 706, 709 (N.Y. 1987) (per curiam) ("A criminal contempt ...
involves an
offense against judicial authority and is utilized to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to compel respect for its mandates.") (citing King v. Barnes, 21 N.E.
182 (1889)); see also Munsell, 4 N.E. at 260 ("[Criminal contempt consists of] those
whose cause and result are a violation of the rights of the public as represented by
their constituted legal tribunals, and a punishment for the wrong in the interest of
public justice, and not in the interest of an individual litigant."); County of Nassau
v. Adjunct Faculty Ass'n of Nassau Community College, 474 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (App.
Div. 1984) (concluding that an injunction order, a violation of which is grounds for
contempt, was valid only so long as the offense against which it guarded affected the
issue being litigated), affd, 481 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1985) (mem.).
21 Munsell, 4 N.E. at 259 ("[Civil contempt cases are] cases whose
occasion is an
injury or wrong done to a party who is a suitor before the court, and has established
a claim upon its protection; and which result in a money indemnity to the litigant,
or a compulsory act or omission enforced for his benefit."); see also Gompers, 221
U.S. at 441-42 (considering that potential remedies include imposition of fines payable to the complainant and imprisonment of defendant).
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contempt."' Most criminal contempts, however, occur outside a
court's presence. Common examples are outright disobedience to
grand jury and trial subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum, or disobedience of sustained orders after legal challenge.'
While New York's Legislature has limited criminal contempts
addressing certain enumerated acts,24 courts observe a common
law catch-all for civil contempts.2
The judiciary's inherent criminal contempt power, although
limited but not conferred by statute, is necessary to a court's
very existence. Its inherent civil contempt power, however, has
no similar imperative. While the criminal contempt power may
be invoked sua sponte or at the instance of the sovereign, a court
may level civil contempt's coercive-remedial sanctions only at the
instance of an aggrieved civil litigant, which occasionally may
include the sovereign. 5 A court must be able to vindicate its
See Douglas, 199 N.E at 37. Some examples include, failure of a nonprivileged witness to testify in court, United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316-17
(1975); assaulting a court officer, Ex ParteTerry, 128 U.S. 289, 298 (1888); instructing a client to disregard a court order, Davis v. Goodson, 635 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Ark.
1982); refusing to testify, O'Neil v. Kasler, 385 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688-89 (App. Div.
1976); refusing to answer court's questions, People v. Clinton, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345
(App. Div. 1973); and making defiant hand gestures as part of a group courtroom
disturbance, Katz v. Murtagh, 269 N.E.2d 816, 818-19 (N.Y. 1971).
23 See, e.g., Gold v. Menna, 255 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that a
witness may be held in contempt for refusing to testify after a grant of immunity);
Koota v. Columbo, 216 N.E.2d 568, 569 (N.Y. 1966) (affirming contempt charges despite assertions that questions were irrelevant); Spector v. Allen, 22 N.E.2d 360,
362-63 (N.Y. 1939) (holding that where a witness intentionally disobeys an order of
a grand jury to produce a specific document, in an action for contempt, the witness
may be prohibited from purging the alleged contempt); Kuriansky v. Ali, 574
N.Y.S.2d 805, 806-07 (App. Div. 1991) (refusing to dismiss a contempt petition
against an individual served with a grand jury subpoenas duces tecum and was personally named in the contempt petition and informed of the possible liability for the
failure to comply).
24 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750(A) (McKinney 1992) provides that "[a]
court of record
has power to punish for criminal contempt a person guilty of any of the following
acts, and no others." (emphasis added); see also James v. Powell, 274 N.Y.S.2d 192,
194-95 (App. Div.), affd, 223 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1966) (limiting the power of criminal
contempt to those offenses listed in Section 750).
2 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 753(A)(8) (McKinney 1992) refers to "any other case, where
an attachment or any other proceeding to punish for a contempt has been usually
adopted and practiced in a court of record."; see also People ex rel. Brewer v.
Platzek, 117 N.Y.S. 852, 853 (App. Div. 1909) (quoting Munsell, 4 N.E. at 259).
26 Compare United States v. Russotti, 746 F.2d 945, 950 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding
that civil contempt is not appropriate in criminal cases and that "[v]indication of the
court's authority is normally accomplished by criminal contempt"), with United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 837-89 (5th Cir. 1980) (conceding that while the
federal contempt statute grants only the court authority to punish for criminal con-

1998]

CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT

authority on behalf of public justice, but there is no such imperative for it to, sua sponte, take over a civil litigation by

standing, without invitation, in the shoes of one of the privately
interested litigants appearing before it.
SECTION 4: INHERENT AND LEGISLATIVELY CREATED CONTEMPT
Any legislature has the power to make criminal that which
is already within a court's inherent criminal contempt power.27
Such a statute does not actually confer additional contempt
power on a court. After a conviction, however, under the usual
criminal prosecution modalities, it is the court which retains the
exclusive power to sentence-but only in accordance with the law
creating the particular crime of criminal contempt. New York's

Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree mirrors almost the entire Judiciary Law Criminal Contempt Statute.2
Despite its
similarity to Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, Judiciary

Law Criminal Contempt is not a crime. Judiciary Law Criminal
Contempt proceedings are neither criminal nor civil, but rather
are sui generis special proceedings to coerce obedience or punish
disobedience.2 9 United States Supreme Court decisions construtempt, such contempt charges may be initiated by indictment without prior court
action).
27 See Munsell, 4 N.E. at 261 (noting that the revised statute attempted to codify and bring the court's inherent contempt power within definite and fixed rules).

28 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50 (McKinney 1988), with N.Y. JUD. LAW §

750 (McKinney 1992) (listing, in both statutes, virtually identical conduct which
may constitute criminal contempt).
29 See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1941); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932) (stating that although contempt is punishable, it is
in a class by itself and not within the Sixth Amendment); Myers v. United States,
264 U.S. 95, 103, 105 (1924) (noting that the Clayton Act classifies disobedience of a
judicial order as a non-criminal offense but such disobedience may be contempt and
punishable at the discretion of the court); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 440-41 (1911) (adhering to the trial judge's findings of fact, and limiting
their inquiry to whether, as a matter of law, the disobedient conduct alleged constitutes contempt); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1904)
(classifying contempt proceedings in two groups-those that preserve the power of
the courts and those that punish the disobedience of individuals); Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888) (noting the inherent power the courts have to punish for
contempt and the necessity for it in the fair administration of justice); Ex parte
Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302-03 (1883) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that since the power
to punish for contempt was often abused, a congressional enactment limited the
power of the courts to punish only to "insure order ... in their presence; faithfulness
[by] their officers[;] ... and obedience to their ... orders"); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 489
N.Y.S.2d 914, 918-20 (App. Div. 1985) (stating that in order for the courts to properly exercise jurisdiction and administer justice, the power to punish for contempt is
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ing and harmonizing the inherent judicial contempt power with
double jeopardy, petty offense and modern day conceptions of
due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
despite their strained reasoning, have not metamorphosed them
into prosecutions of crime." "[Pirocedural protections which
have gradually surrounded imposition of criminal contempt
penalties [are merely] accretions of 'fundamental fairness' rather
than application
of ...
the Bill of Rights to contempt prosecutions
31
"
'crimes.'
as
SECTION 5: NEW YORK'S JUDICIARY LAW ARTICLE 19
Judiciary Law Article 1932 is a derivative of the Code of Civil
Procedure of 1909 which preceded the Civil Practice Act and the
present Civil Practice Law and Rules. Historically, the statute
traces back to the Revised Statutes of the 19th Century and, bea necessity); People ex rel. Frank v. McCann, 237 N.Y.S. 85, 88 (App. Div. 1929)
(stating that criminal contempt proceedings are not true criminal proceedings because their purpose is not to vindicate the criminal law), affd, 170 N.E. 898 (1930).
30See Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1972) (vacating reversal of lower
court's finding of criminal contempt for plaintiffs refusal to answer the grand jury's
questions); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 197 (1968) (noting that the Supreme
Court has held that even the potential for severe punishment for contempt does not,
by itself, warrant a jury trial); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958)
(deciding that the Fifth Amendment does not require that contempts subject to
prison terms of more than one year be based on a grand jury indictment); Gompers
v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (holding that contempt convictions are
crimes even though there are no constitutional protections such as a right to trial by
jury).
S United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1101 (7th Cir. 1970); see Young
v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1987) (holding that even
though criminal contempt is now regarded as an ordinary crime, such characterization is intended only to rebut earlier sentiment that they are not deserving of normal criminal proceedings); Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 440 (holding that the requirement
of due process in a criminal contempt proceeding can be satisfied by providing notice
and an opportunity to be heard); accord Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester County,
824 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that there is a constitutional distinction
between serious crimes and criminal contempt, and that providing notice and an
opportunity to be heard satisfy due process requirements in contempt proceedings).
See generally Hanbury v. Benedict, 146 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (App. Div. 1914) (holding
that an order finding one guilty of contempt may be reversed by notice rather than a
writ of certiorari).
32 N.Y. JUD. LAW art. 19 (McKinney 1992) (containing
contempt laws); see Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Bricklayers' & Mason Plasterers' Intl Union, Local No. 45,
193 N.Y.S. 368, 369-70 (App. Div. 1922) (explaining that criminal contempt provisions existing in the 1909 code were transferred to the Judiciary Law and became
sections 750 and 753 of that law); Hanbury, 146 N.Y.S. at 49 (explaining that the
1909 provisions of the statute relating to criminal contempt were transferred from
the Code of Civil Procedure to the Judicial Law).
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fore that, to ad hoc local statutes. 3 Similar to other subjects of
the law, Article 19 is a self contained unit.3 Article 19's regulation of the judiciary's inherent contempt power-procedures,
punishments and remedies-are all set forth therein. The statute draws on the civil modalities for both criminal and civil contempts by reference to its procedures and forms, seemingly to
demonstrate an intention not to subject contempt proceedings to
the letter of the law applicable to criminal prosecutions for crime
generally.
SECTION 6: COURT ORDERS MUST BE CLEAR AND COMMUNICATED
One cannot be in contempt of a mere judgment. 35 A person

may be contemptable, but may not be held in contempt for a
mere admonition or observation of such conduct preceding a
court's order.36 A clear court order avoids any uncertainty in the
minds of those to whom it is addressed and who are charged
with obedience." The order itself, however, need not explicitly
warn of the consequences of disobedience." Various terms have
'3 See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 715 (1964) (noting that in 1829
New York enacted a statute defining criminal contempt and designated punishment); People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y. 402, 406 (1882) (stating that the Civil
Code preserved the distinction between criminal and civil contempt as established
in the Revised Statutes).
See, e.g., People v. Valenza, 457 N.E.2d 748, 751 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that
prosecutorial discretion, when choosing between two statutes that punish the same
conduct, is limited by legislative intent to make a specific statute the exclusive
means to punish particular conduct).
35 See Pereira v. Pereira, 319 N.E.2d 413, 418 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that a defendant's violation of a divorce judgment is not sufficient to hold the defendant in con-

tempt).

For example, in United States v. Cutler, 840 F. Supp. 959 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995), the court noted that the use of the word
"admonition," which means "warning," could be unclear, at least to a lay person. Id.
at 964. Furthermore, the Cutler court concluded that the judge's admonition could
be interpreted by a "literal legal mind" as something less than an order. Id. Similarly it has been noted that the court must determine whether the individual is capable of comprehending the warning. See United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552,
1565 (11th Cir. 1987).
', See Ketchum v. Edwards, 47 N.E. 918, 920 (N.Y. 1897) (stating
that because
punishment for contempt may involve the loss of property or liberty, it is a reasonable requirement that the order be clearly expressed); New York State Ass'n of
Counties v. Axelrod, 629 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 1995) (finding no evidence of
contempt where the order allegedly disobeyed was ambiguous).
*"See Keator v. Keator, 622 N.Y.S.2d 338, 339 (App. Div. 1995) (rejecting the
respondent's assertion that because the court "order did contain any warning that
its violation could result in incarceration, principles of due process and fundamental
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been used to describe the requirement that a court order be
"explicit," "precise," and
clear, including "unequivocal,"
9
"reasonably specific."

Distilled to their essence, these terms

express the fundamental postulate that if government is to
command and later punish, it may not do so in language so
vague and undefined that it does not afford fair notice and
warning of what is required or forbidden." Orders must have
operative commands capable of enforcement, not merely expressions of abstract conclusions or principles of law.4 In determining whether an order is sufficiently clear to the audience to
whom it is addressed, an inquiry into its terms and surrounding
context 42 is required.4 3 The issue of a court order's clarity is a
mixed question of law and fact, and there exists no particular
verbal formula.44 An issue of good faith arises when failure to
comply with an order is asserted to be the result of its imprecifairness preclude the imposition of such a sanction").
39See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 195 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that in order to secure obedience of a court order, courts should be explicit and precise in their commands) ; United States v.
Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1565 (11th Cir. 1987) ("To support a conviction for criminal
contempt for violation of an order of a court, the order must be reasonably specific."); United States v. Charmer Indus., 722 F.2d 1073, 1079 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding
no contempt because the understanding of the order was not "clear and unequivocal"); McCain v. Dinkins, 639 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (N.Y. 1994) ("To sustain a civil contempt, a lawful judicial order expressing an unequivocal mandate must have been in
effect and disobeyed.").
"' See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 438-39 (1976)
(citing section 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
423, 438 (1959) ("A State may not issue commands to its citizens, under criminal
sanctions, in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of what
conduct might transgress them.").
41 See International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade
Ass'n,
389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967) ("The most fundamental postulates of our legal order forbid
the imposition of a penalty for disobeying a command that defies comprehension.");
United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 899 F.2d 143, 146 (2d Cir.
1990) ("An unclear order provides insufficient notice to justify a sanction as harsh as
contempt.").
42 See United States v. Revie, 834 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir.
1987) (noting that
the specificity on an order depends on the context in which it was given (citing
Turner, 812 F.2d at 1565).
See In re Levine, 27 F.3d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that in determining
the contempt of an order, the context in which it was raised and the audience to
which it is addressed must be considered) (citing In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080,
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
44 See United States v. Cutler, 815 F. Supp. 599, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting
that the court must consider the relevant facts at the time the directive was issued
to determine whether it is an "order" to which criminal contempt can attach).
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sion.45 For an order to be clear, however, it need not define its
constituent terms which otherwise fall within the universe of
common English usage. 46 Clarity is always subject to review regardless of whether an order has been appealed, stayed or disobeyed.47 If the failure to comply is capable of a reasonable construction consistent with innocence, a contempt adjudication is
not permissible. 48 A corollary to the reasonable construction
analysis prohibits the imposition of punishment on conduct outside the ambit of an order's explicit command.49
"Ordered" is not a term of art such that it must, for its own
sake, be included in a court's command, as long as there is no
doubt that a reasonable person would clearly understand that he
is under compulsion. 5 An "order" includes the term "mandate"
and both terms are used almost interchangeably in the language
of the law. One is no less or more a command than the other, although "mandate," in some quarters, is viewed as synonymous
with a written order. For the disobedient, it is a distinction
without a legal difference. 5' The content of an order need not be
communicated in any special manner or form. In contrast, a
court order commanding the appearance of one accused of diso45 See United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116, 1126 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[A] defense of
good faith compliance arises when a defendant has not refused to comply ... but has
failed to comply because of the indefiniteness of the order ....").
46 See United States v. Air Traffic Controllers, 678 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982)
(finding that an order need not list "the components of a term whose boundaries are
understood by common parlance").
47 See Coan v. Coan, 447 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (App. Div. 1982) ('The failure to perfect
the appeal ... does not preclude [the court's] review of that order to determine
whether it clearly expresses a mandate subject to contempt for its willful violation.").
48 See Department of Envtl. Protection of New York v.
Department of Envtl.
Conservation of New York, 513 N.E.2d 706, 710 (N.Y. 1987) (per curiam); Ketchum
v. Edwards, 47 N.E. 918, 920 (N.Y. 1897).
49 See Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the plaintiff could not be punished for failure to produce documents requested by
the order because such documents did not exist); Holtzman v. Beatty, 468 N.Y.S.2d
905, 908 (App. Div. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that failure to provide handwriting
samples was not contempt because the order did not specify that such samples were
to be furnished).
See generally O'Neil v. Kasler, 385 N.Y.S.2d 684, 691 (App. Div. 1976) (noting
that a witness did not have to be "ordered" to answer prosecutor's questions where
it was obvious that the witness understood he would have to answer or be held in
contempt).
r' See People v. Giglio, 428 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (App. Div. 1980) (stating, in dicta,
that without authority to the contrary, one could be held in contempt for failure to
obey an oral order of the court).
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beying a previously issued order may have its own special statutory or court rule. Except for this one subtlety, it suffices that a
party to be charged with obedience be aware of the contents of an
order.5 2 An oral direction in open court has as much binding
authority on those who heard it as a written order signed and
distributed.5 3 Evidence of actual knowledge of the order's contents determines whether a person may be held punitively accountable for disobedience to an order, regardless of whether the
order was formally, or even "informally" served;4 notably, it is
not sufficient to communicate the fact that an order has been issued without publishing its contents. 55 However, when individuals deliberately close their eyes and ears to the contents of
an order, they are chargeable in law with the knowledge they
otherwise
would have obtained but for their own willful blind56
ness.
52

See McCormick v. Axelrod, 453 N.E.2d 508, 513 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam)

(stating that a party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the order
but actual service of the order upon that party is not required).
See In re Ithaca Journal News, Inc., 292 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (Ithaca City Ct.
1968).
See McCormick, 453 N.E.2d at 513; People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y.
263, 277-78 (1853); Power Auth. v. Moeller, 395 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (App. Div. 1977)
(noting that personal service of a court order is not required if actual knowledge is
present) (citing City Sch. Dist. of Schenectady v. Schenectady Fed'n of Teachers, 375
N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (App. Div. 1975)); People ex rel. Illingworth v. Court of Oyer &
Terminer, 41 N.Y.S. 702, 704 (App. Div. 1896) (noting that not all orders by judges
are reduced to writing).
See People v. McCowan, 652 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1995) (dismissing charges
against the defendant for violating an order of protection because the substance of
the order was not conveyed); see also Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. at 271 (stating that the language of an order "must have a reasonable construction, with reference to the subject about which it is employed").
See In re Barbara, 180 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928-29 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Gallun v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 195 N.W. 703, 704-05 (Wis. 1923) (holding that refusal to accept a subpoena and remain so contents could be read, did not relieve the defendant
from obeying the contents of the order); see also United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672,
675 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that one cannot intentionally remain ignorant of a fact
material to one's conduct in order to avoid legal consequences); In re Hildreth, 284
N.Y.S.2d 755, 760 (App. Div. 1967) (holding that vague allegations of an inability to
comply with a court order are not sufficient to mitigate a disobedience of the order);
Heller v. Levinson, 152 N.Y.S. 35, 36-37 (App. Div. 1915) (finding sufficient service
when papers were acknowledged by the defendant after being placed in the defendant's pocket because he was presumed to have ascertained the contents); People v.
Forsyth, 439 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (upholding a conviction for failure to
appear pursuant to a subpoena based on the defendant's inability to show reasonable cause for the non-compliance). A person charged with blatant non-compliance,
however, has an opportunity to prove otherwise. See id. Similarly, in People v. Sugarman, 215 N.Y.S. 56 (App. Div. 1926), the court held that "lack of knowledge re-
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SECTION 7: SUBPOENAS AS MANDATES AND THEIR SERVICE

Judicial subpoenas are mandates of the court.57 It is highly
improbable "that there is any lawyer in the United States who
does not know that a subpoena is a court order.""8 A grand jury
subpoena duces tecum59 issued by a prosecutor in good faith is a
mandate of the court and disobedience of it is punishable as a
contempt of court just like any other court order or mandate."
All subpoenas are self-limited by the terms of their written
commands contained within their four corners. Attorneys have
the authority to issue subpoenas on behalf of a court in accordance with the law.6 ' Thereafter, only the court may modify the
terms unless attorney ministerial "modification" occurs in strict
conformity with statute or special court authorization. 62 When
sult[ing] from an avoidance of any endeavor to know what happened ...
amounts in
law to knowledge." Id. at 63; see also Grant v. Greene Consol. Copper Co., 110
N.Y.S. 253, 256 (App. Div. 1908) (reversing a contempt charge because failure to
comply with the order was not a willful refusal to comply). But see McDonald v.
Ames Supply Co., 238 N.E.2d 726, 728-29 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that although a person had knowledge of service and did not resist or avoid it, the order was nonetheless void because service was improper).
67 In New York, for example, non-compliance of
a judicial subpoena, as a mandate of the court, results in contempt with penalties thereunder. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
2308(a) (McKinney 1991). The statute also provides, however, that a non-judicial
subpoena is not a mandate of the court, and failure to comply allows the issuer to
motion to compel performance. See id. at 2308(b). The New York Criminal Procedure Law states, in relevant part, "[a] 'subpoena' is a process of a court directing the
person to whom it is addressed to attend and appear as a witness in a designated
action or proceeding in such court." N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 610.10(2) (McKinney
1995). Similarly, the Criminal Procedure Law uses the same distinction between a
subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum, as does the Civil Practice Laws and Rules.
See id. § 610.10(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2301 (stating the purpose of both a subpoena and a
subpoena duces tecum).
Waste Conversion v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., 893 F.2d 605, 613 (3d Cir. 1990)
(Scirica, J., dissenting).
69A subpoena duces tecum differs from a subpoena in that the former "requires
production of books, papers and other things," whereas the latter "requires the attendance of a person to give testimony." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2301; see also N.Y. CRIMI.

PRoc. LAW § 610.10(3).

6See People ex rel. Van Der Beek v. McClosky, 238 N.Y.S.2d 676, 681 (App.
Div. 1963) (upholding the validity of a subpoena issued by a district attorney commanding. a police officer to appear as a witness); Manning v. Valente, 72 N.Y.S.2d
88, 94 (App. Div.), affd, 77 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1947) (upholding criminal contempt conviction for failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum).
61See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(a) (authorizing an attorney of record to issue subpoenas necessary to an action).
6Section
2304 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules allows for the
modifications of an issued subpoena through subsequent motions to the court to so
modify. Similarly, if one other than the court issued the subpoena, a request for
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an attorney "adjourns" a subpoena or bargains its terms of
compliance so as to vary it from its terms as originally written,
the attorney is taking a calculated risk because this waives later
judicial intervention should there be noncompliance with the
subpoena. The attorney is not modifying the subpoena in law,
which only a court has authority to do. Thus, if the attorney
chooses to exercise the limited authority accorded by statute to
"adjourn" the witness's appearance "from day to day upon reasonable notice," the attorney thereby waives potential penalty for
non-compliance.' Such oral modification is not a subpoena and,
therefore, a contempt proceeding so predicated will fail because
disobedience here is not against a court mandate, but merely to
an attorney's verbal command.6" The terms of the original subpoena dictate the subpoenaed witness's duty. Such subpoena is
the "only process under which [the witness may be] required to
appear and testify" or produce documents."
Service of a subpoena is done in the same manner as a
summons, but the requirement of its personal delivery has been

said, without elucidation, to be "somewhat less stringent" than
that required for a summons.6 6 The purpose of service is to give
modification should first be addressed to the issuer and then a further motion to
modify may be made to the court. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2304. Further, if a person
served with a subpoena "is given reasonable notice of such [modification], no further
process shall be required to compel his attendance." Id. at 2305(a). Moreover, the
New York Criminal Procedure Law contains almost identical language. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 610.10(2).
6 Whether the theory be waiver or estoppel, the attorney's oral modification
precludes penalty.
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302, 2305(a) (providing for oral modification in a civil proceeding); N.Y. CRM.PROC. LAW § 610.10(2) (providing for formal modification in a
criminal proceeding); see also In re Kaplan, 168 N.E.2d 660, 662 (N.Y. 1960) (holding
that an oral command by a grand jury foreman is not a mandate of the court and
therefore failure to comply is not contempt); Spector v. Allen, 22 N.E.2d 360, 364-65
(N.Y. 1939) (holding that an oral direction from a district attorney is not a mandate
of the court and therefore non-compliance is not contempt); Maritime Fish Prods.,
Inc., v. World Wide Fish Prods., Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 281, 287 (App. Div. 1984) (stating
that a written subpoena containing a provision to appear for any adjourned date can
make a party answerable for contempt for failure to comply, if the party has reasonable notice of such date); In re Mullen, 31 N.Y.S.2d 710, 715 (Queens County Ct.
1941) (differentiating the power of the court from the district attorney and the
foreman of the grand jury to issue lawful mandates).
Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1926). See Spector, 22
N.E.2d at 364-65 ("The subpoena must be in writing and only disobedience of the
written command is subject to the drastic punishment meted out for a criminal contempt."); Mullen, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16 (holding that contempt cannot result from
failure to comply with an oral extension of a subpoena).
In re Barbara, 183 N.Y.S.2d 147, 149 (App. Div. 1959). But see N.Y. C.P.L.R.
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notice of what is commanded so that a party may resist compli-

ance by lawful measures or simply comply-in either case because the party knows what is commanded.67 "Courtesy service"
on a witness's attorney on behalf of the witness, however, does

not provide sufficient service on the witness, and therefore even
though apprised of its terms, the witness may not be punished
for disobedience. Formality of service drives home the message
of required obedience.' Properly served, a subpoena affords a

witness no discretion as to obedience. 9 Its purpose would be
frustrated if a witness were allowed to decide, absent good cause
in law, whether obedience would be forthcoming. A subpoena is
not "an invitation to a game of hare and hounds in which the

witness must testify [or produce physical evidence] only if cornered .... "70

SECTION 8: THE DUTY TO OBEY COURT ORDERS
As stated in Ketchum v. Edwards,7 an "order of a court
having jurisdiction must be implicitly obeyed, however erroneous
it may be, and ... it is no answer [to a charge of disobedience] ...
that the order or judgment was broader than the facts war2303 (stating that "[a] subpoena shall be served in the same manner as a summons").
See Barbara, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 150 (citing Hiller v. Burlington & Mo. River
R.R. Co., 70 N.Y. 223, 227 (1877)).
"See In re Depue, 77 N.E. 798, 801 (N.Y. 1906) (recognizing that no authority
allows jurisdiction to be conferred upon a client for contempt purposes by service
upon the attorney); Broman v. Stern, 567 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830-31 (App. Div. 1991)
(holding that an attorney not officially designated as an agent to accept service of
process lacked authority to accept service of a subpoena and therefore the attorney's
client is not in contempt); People v. Balt, 312 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 1970)
(per curiam) (stating that personal service of an order to show cause to answer contempt charges is mandatory); Kanbar v. Quad Cinema Corp., 581 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261
(Sup. Ct. 1991), affd as modified, 600 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div. 1993) (holding two
individuals of a a corporation were not in contempt for violation of a restraining notice because they were not personally served).
9See People v. Balt, 312 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 1970) (per curiam)
(stating that personal service of an order to show cause to answer contempt charges
is mandatory); Kanbar, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (holding two individuals of a corporation were not in contempt for violation of a restraining notice because they were not
personally served).
70 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). Relying on Bryan, the court
in People v. DAmato, held that reliance on the advice of third parties, including attorneys, is not good cause in law for failure to comply, but the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to show the party did not have good cause. See 211 N.Y.S.2d 877,
881-82 (App. Div. 1961).
71 47 N.E. 918 (N.Y. 1897).
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ranted, or gave relief beyond ..." that which was sought or justi-

fied under the circumstances.2 The court further stated that an
"orderly jurisprudence" forbids litigants to nullify or set aside
orders even if their improvidence, misapprehension and mistake
are obvious.73 This is why the law provides for stays and appeals. A "very clearly wrong" court order is not void and must be
obeyed if its operation is not stayed through orderly process.74
Only orders which are transparently invalid, void or frivolous
need not be obeyed.75 Whether an order fits one of these categories or is issued without jurisdiction is a question which ultimately has to be answered by the judiciary. Those who simply
disobey an order and later assert one of these categories as a defense, assume the risk of punitive consequences should their position ultimately not prevail in the courts.7"
SECTION 9: CORPORATIONS AND CONTEMPT

As a creature of the state, a corporation receives its franchise subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its
charter.77 In accordance with law, it is entirely proper for the
state to investigate a corporation's activities and, to that end,
examine its books and papers.7" It has no Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.79 At an earlier time, it was
7

Id. at 920.

73id.

7 People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263, 270 (1853); see also Walker v.

City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967) (requiring orderly judicial review
of an injunction prior to disobeying the injunction); In re Landau, 243 N.Y.S. 732,
734 (App. Div. 1930) (per curiam) (stating that a party may not blatantly disregard
an erroneous order, but must rather institute formal judicial proceedings to challenge it).
7'See Walker, 388 U.S. at 315; Schulz v. State, 654 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (N.Y.
1995) (stating that the order "was so manifestly lacking in validity that its disobedience cannot be punished as a contempt").
76 See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258,
293 (1947)
(holding that parties may be held in contempt for violating a court order when the
decision regarding the validity of the order was pending).
77See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) (discussing the relationship between the state and a corporation including the responsibilities a corporation has
toward the state).
See id. (holding that a corporation has no right to refuse the state access to its
books and papers in a judicial proceeding).
79 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-83 (1911) (citing Hale, 201
U.S. at 74-75); Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (X&Y) v. Kuriansky, 505
N.E.2d 925, 930 (N.Y. 1987) (stating that "a custodian of corporate records may not
refuse to produce them even though they may incriminate him personally"); Bleak78
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thought that corporations were immune from punishment for
contempt due to their impersonal character and the fact that
they could not be placed in handcuffs. 0 It is now the law that a
corporation may be held in contempt."' There are methods for
coercing or punishing a corporation-fines being the most obvious. It would be anomalous to penalize agents8 2 and officers of a
corporation but not to penalize the entity itself.
SECTION 10: CORPORATE OFFICERS AND CONTEMPT

A corporation as an entity obeys or disobeys legal process
through its officers or agents served with or having knowledge of
the law's writ. The case is different with respect to the officers
or agents as individuals. While they obey in a representative capacity on behalf of the corporation, corporate officers disobey in a
purely personal capacity." "It is as useless as attempting to
demonstrate that twice two make four, to say that a corporation
can have possession of nothing except by the human beings who
are its officers, and it is to them, and not the intangible being
ley v. Schlesinger, 62 N.E.2d 85, 86 (N.Y. 1945) (noting that a corporate officer cannot refuse to produce corporate records even if disclosure would incriminate the officer or the corporation); In re Barnes, 97 N.E. 508, 510 (N.Y. 1912) (recognizing that
neither the corporation nor the custodian of its records may justify the refusal to
submit the records on the grounds of self-incrimination).
See Continental Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Whitecourt Constr. Corp., 297 N.Y.S.
338, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (reviewing prior case law on corporate immunity).
8 See id. at 340. In Wilson, the Court stated that a corporation is subject to legal proceedings as is an individual. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 374. The Court further noted
that a subpoena issued on a corporation is analogous to one served on its agents, as
a defendant corporation can act only through its agents. See id. at 377 (citing
Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624, 627 (1878)).
See ContinentalMortgage Guar. Co., 297 N.Y.S. at 340.

Compare Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117-18 (1988) (holding that
while a person, as agent of a corporation, is not immune from Fifth Amendment
privileges, any incriminating act so divulged against the individual acting in his individual capacity is deemed an act of the corporation if the agent was acting under
that capacity); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944) (noting that evidence of wrongful acts by corporate officers is usually found in the corporation's
business records); Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92, 115 (1906) (stating that if
individuals who have custody of the books were given immunity to court orders under guise of agents acting on behalf of a corporation, no corporate documents would
ever be subject to review), and Continental Mortgage Guar. Co., 297 N.Y.S. at 340
(stating that "liltwould be an anomaly in the law if [it] were to be [held] that while
the courts [have] the power to punish the officers and agents of a corporation, they
do not have the power to punish the principal itself"), with Wilson, 221 U.S. at 378
(stating that an agent of a corporation is bound by a subpoena issued to a corporation unless he could prove the documents were personal).
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they represent and act for, that the law directs its process .... "84
It is clear that "no individual may refuse to surrender existing
[corporate] documents ... if they be within [the individual's] control." A command to a corporation is a command to its officers
and agents having knowledge of the command to take the necessary steps to insure compliance. 6 A corporate officer who, with
notice of a court's order, impedes compliance, or, fails to take appropriate action within his power to effect compliance is, just
like the corporation, punishable by contempt. 7 The converse,
however, is not true. An officer or agent of a corporation who either has no knowledge of an order to the corporation or who does
not participate in its disobedience is not guilty of contempt, and

the corporation's contempt may not be imputed to such individual. 8
A corporate records custodian must produce records in response to legal process even if the records and their production
will incriminate him.89 Furthermore, an agent of a corporation
Nelson, 201 U.S. at 115-16.
United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1955).
See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 376; People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 262,
271-72 (1853) (holding all members of a corporate body having knowledge of an injunction bound by its terms); Citibank, NA_ v. Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 447
N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div. 1982) (upholding the court's power to punish corporate
officers for contempt if personal service and knowledge requirements are met).
'1 See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 376; see also United
States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1526
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 226 (1996) (stating that the unequivocal direction
by a subpoena to produce an organization's records requires persons with knowledge
of the subpoena to comply or face contempt); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349, 356-57 (1950) (requiring individuals in offices of joint responsibility to act
within their power to comply with the order); Geller v. Flamount Realty Corp., 183
N.E. 520, 521-22 (N.Y. 1932) (holding individual officers violating court orders liable
for civil contempt).
See Continental Mortgage, 297 N.Y.S. at 340 (stating that the lower court
lacked authority to hold in contempt a corporate officer who was not a party to contemptuous conduct); see also Ross v. Thousand Island Park Ass'n, 196 N.Y.S. 811,
813 (App. Div. 1922) (holding a contempt conviction improper where the individual
neither knew nor participated in any violations to the injunction). See generally
People v. Byrne, 570 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that criminal liability of
corporations will not be imputed to individuals playing no part in criminal acts).
See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758-61 (1983) (holding a claim of
privilege is not a "substitute for relevant evidence"); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at
117-19 (holding that a custodian of corporate records may not resist production under the self-incrimination privilege); White, 322 U.S. at 699-701 (holding custodians
of corporate or union records may not withhold production to escape selfincrimination); Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-86 (extending requirement of production to a
corporate officer against whom indictments are pending); Grand Jury Subpoenas
(X&Y) v. Kuriansky, 505 N.E.2d 925, 930 (N.Y. 1987) (holding Fifth Amendment
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designated to produce documents must furnish all documents
available to the corporation, not merely those of which he has
personal knowledge." Obviously, the law should not encourage
corporations to designate the village idiot as its agent for compliance with court process as a means of thwarting or effectively
preventing compliance.
SECTION 11: CONTEMPT AND COURT JURISDICTION

Contempt is predicated on the violation of a legal duty, not a
moral obligation.91 If a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction its order need not be obeyed." This proposition, although
simple to state, is nonetheless vexing to apply and live under.
Admittedly, "[tihe distinction between subject matter jurisdiction
and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal metaphysics."93 In particular, the distinction rests on the notion that
courts have limited authority, some of constitutional origin,
which is designed to protect citizens against the abuse of judicial
authority. 4 The courts, like "the political branches of the government, must respect the limits of their authority."9 A judge
who knowingly and intentionally exceeds his powers or abjures
his duty is acting in violation of his oath of office and should be
impeached, just as any other official.
A court's order does not bind non-parties merely because
they have knowledge of its existence.99 Non-parties may only be
punished if they act as servants or agents of the parties, or, if
privilege inapplicable to corporations and that a corporate records custodian must
produce records even though they may incriminate the custodian personally).
" See Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 646 F. Supp. 923, 929 (W.D.N.C. 1986) ("The
agent of a corporation who is designated to produce documents must furnish all information available to the corporation. This responsibility is not limited by [the
agent's] own personal knowledge of the situation.").
91 See Doyle v. Hofstader, 177 N.E. 489, 497 (N.Y. 1931) ("To uphold a finding
that his conduct amounted to a contempt, it must appear that in refusing to answer
he was violating a legal, and not merely a moral, obligation.").
See People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 262, 266 (1853) (noting that orders and judgments of a court without jurisdiction are void).
93United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487
U.S. 72, 77 (1988).
4 See id.
95Id.
9 See State Univ. of N.Y. v. Denton, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (App. Div. 1970)
(stating knowledge is not sufficient to impose liability on non-parties for violating a
court order); see also Chase Natl Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934); International Bd. of Teamsters v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 123 F.2d 326 (10th Cir.
1941); Briddon v. Briddon, 128 N.E. 675 (N.Y. 1920).
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with knowledge of the order's terms, they act collusively with
parties in disobedience of the order.97 However, even a court ultimately lacking subject matter jurisdiction has the power to issue orders to preserve existing conditions when a decision is
pending regarding its jurisdiction.98 Until a court's jurisdiction is
determined, its authority is derived from the necessity to issue
such orders as are necessary to preserve the status quo.9 9 A
party who makes a private determination of the law and of the
court's jurisdiction and disobeys such an interim order acts at his
peril for contempt purposes. 00 If, ultimately, an order is confirmed to have been void on its face, transparently invalid,
frivolous, or some other semantic equivalent, the party who disobeys it is not punishable by contempt for he, in retrospect, was
never bound to obey in the first place.10' If the decision is adverse to him he will be punished for his contempt.'
Having
predicted the ruling incorrectly, he will be held accountable for
intentional disobedience, even if his belief in the order's invalidity was the product of good faith ignorance or a bad law school.
"Court orders, [for policy reasons,] are accorded a special status
in American jurisprudence." 3 Only where a court lacks subject
97See Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[Tihe only
occasion when a person not a party may be punished, is when he has helped to bring
about, not merely what the decree has forbidden ... but what it has power to forbid
98 See Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d 858, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1943) (stating that
orders by the court are lawful and binding while the determination of the validity of
jurisdiction is pending); see also Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir.
1935) ("Willful disobedience of an injunction, however erroneous, issued by a court
having jurisdiction while such injunction is in force unreversed constitutes contempt
of court.") (citing Patton v. United States, 288 F. 812, 815 (4th Cir. 1923)).
9 See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906); see also National Maritime Union v. Aquaslide ' Dive Corp., 737 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding a court's power to issue injunctions in order to maintain the status quo
while a jurisdictional question is pending).
'0 See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1947);
Children's Village v. Greenburgh Eleven Teachers' Union Fed'n of Teachers Local
1532, 648 N.Y.S.2d 616 (App. Div. 1996) (providing an example of defendants disobeying a temporary court order and being held in criminal contempt).
1 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (discussing the
notion that an invalid or frivolous order is not binding); see also State v. Congress of
Racial Equality, 460 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that an order must be
obeyed so long as a court has jurisdiction and the order is not void on its face).
'02 See Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (discussing the proposition
that an order must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and
proper proceedings).
0' In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347 (1st Cir. 1986).
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matter jurisdiction, or where its order is facially void, may a
party disobey and later, as a defense, challenge its underlying
validity.' °4
Additionally, once a court with subject matter jurisdiction
issues an order to a party over whom it has in personam jurisdiction, the commands of that order remain with the person regardless of where he subsequently goes.'
As for contempt proceedings themselves, there is a presumption of subject matter
jurisdiction over the contempt.' 6
SECTION 12: SERVICE OF COURT ORDERS
An oral order given from the bench in open court by the

presiding judge is an order served upon all those assembled to
whom it is directed.0 7 A client may be similarly "served" with a
court's order by his attorney's communication of its contents and
this communication is presumed if the attorney has knowledge of
the order.' 8 Certification of a court's order prior to its service is
certainly not necessary to give it binding force."° By definition,
an order is "served" when the recipient has knowledge of its existence and its terms."0
104See Vakalis v. Shawmut Corp., 925 F.2d 34, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(requiring compliance with court orders even when suspected to be unlawful);
Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1346 (holding a party subject to a court order
and bound to its terms even if there exists a belief that the order is unlawful); see
also United States v. Underwood, 880 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir. 1989) (afffiming mandatory compliance regardless of a good faith belief of its unlawfulness).
See Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1932)
(holding a decree which ordered the recovery of a total of $49,292.89 "binding upon
the respondent, not simply within the District of Massachusetts, but throughout the
United States").
10 See Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 284-86 (1889) (holding that where a judgment is under collateral attack, there is still a presumption of jurisdiction over the
contempt proceedings).
107 See People ex rel. Illingworth v. Court of Oyer
& Terminer, 41 N.Y.S. 702,
704-05 (App. Div. 1896) (holding that a mandate given by the court, whether oral or
written, binding on those in the courtroom).
"08See United States v. Revie, 834 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding defendant had adequate notice of a show cause order because his attorney was on notice).
19 See United States v. Underwood, 880 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that defendant was "willfully" disobeying an order of the court even though "he relied in good faith upon his counsel's advice that the subpoena was unlawful and that
he must refuse to testify in order to preserve the issue for appeal").
11 See Campanella v. Campanella, 548 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (App. Div. 1989)
(holding that one with actual knowledge of a court mandate can be punished for contempt even though not personally served); see also McCormick v. Axelrod, 453
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SECTION 13: THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE
An order issued by a court with jurisdiction and pleadings
properly invoking its action and properly served upon parties
must be obeyed however erroneous it may be. Even if the order
is based upon the assumed validity of a void law going to the
merits of the case, the parties must comply with it."' It is for the
court, in the first instance, to determine the validity of a law and
it must be respected until its order is reversed for error whether
by orderly appellate process or sua sponte by the issuing court
itself.12 This imperative applies even if a party has eminently
proper grounds to object to the order.'
This is also true without
regard to the constitutionality of a law under which a court
4
acts:1
As a general rule, an unconstitutional statute is an absolute
nullity and may not form the basis of any legal right or legal
proceedings, yet until its unconstitutionality has been judicially
declared in appropriate proceedings, no person charged with its
observance under an order or decree may disregard or violate
the order or the decree with immunity from a charge of contempt of court; and he may not raise the question of its unconstitutionality in collateral proceedings on appeal from a judgment of conviction for contempt of the orders or decree .... 115
N.E.2d 508, 513 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam); People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 74 N.E.
431, 434 (N.Y. 1905) (illustrating the proposition that it is not necessary for the
court order to be served to impose actual knowledge); Shakun v. Shakun, 204
N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (App. Div. 1960).
...
See Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (discussing the defendant's
obligation to follow a court order regardless of its validity).
112See id. at 190; see also Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221
U.S. 418,
450 (1911) (holding that a party is without power to judge the validity of court orders and set them aside by an act of disobedience); Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S.
542, 548 (1909) (holding that a judgment is not necessarily void where jurisdiction is
erroneous); Seril v. Belnord Tenants Ass'n, 526 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463-64 (App. Div.
1988) (finding that a prior jurisdictionally valid order must be maintained); Garry v.
Garry, 467 N.Y.S.2d 175, 180 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (barring a party held in contempt from
collaterally attacking the judgment itself where the judgment was entered by consent of the parties based upon their own voluntary agreement).
113 See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 445
U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (holding that an order must be obeyed until it is reversed regardless of whether those subject to the order have reasonable grounds to object to
the order); Howat, 258 U.S. at 189-90 (mandating compliance with an injunction issued by a court, even if it is erroneous).
114 See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330
U.S. 258, 293 (1947)
(holding that a court order is binding notwithstanding the constitutionality of the
Act under which the order is issued).
"5 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967) (quoting Fields v.
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An apparent but not actual exception is the successful plea
that a court's order itself is unconstitutional. This " 'exception'
to the general rule [is] derive[d] not from the unconstitutionality
of the [court's] order [itself] but from the exercise of a specific

constitutional right not to cooperate with judicial process" in certain instances.'16 Only when a court is so clearly outside its
authority as to be merely usurping judicial power, may a court's
order be disregarded." 7 In other words, if a court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction and its process is not issued to determine whether it has jurisdiction, then its process itself is a
nullity. The ability to disobey a court's order is subject to a caveat: the very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a controversy, if only to decide, after taking the matter
under advisement, that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the
controversy."8
The courts have phrased the collateral bar rule in various
ways. Each formulation contributes something of its own. In

particular, a subjective good faith belief, without more, that a
court's order is erroneous does not relieve one from the duty of

compliance absent the obtaining of still another order staying its
enforcement until the original order is either vacated or reversed."9 Additionally, even orders which are issued under misapprehension or mistake of law or fact must nevertheless be

City of Fairfield, 143 So.2d 177, 180 (Ala. 1962)); cf. United States v. Terry, 17 F.3d
575, 579 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that the appropriate method for challenging
the validity of an order is to file a petition requesting that the order be vacated or
amended).
"6 Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 197 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979)
(citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975)).
See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 309-10 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(discussing the rare instance where a court order could be disobeyed and treated as
though it were a letter to a newspaper).
"a See Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.
1992) (retaining jurisdiction for the appellate court to consider a contempt issue
prior to the trial court's determination of its own jurisdiction).
19 See Bater v. Regan, 468 N.E.2d 688, 689 (N.Y. 1984) (recognizing that a
court order must be obeyed even if it appears to be "misguided and erroneous"). In
Kampf v. Worth, 485 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. Div. 1985), the court upheld a finding of
contempt by a mother who violated a court order commanding visitation rights to
the child's grandparents. See id. at 345. The court justified its decision, noting that
"'the mere act of disobedience, regardless of its motive, is sufficient to sustain a
finding of civil contempt if such disobedience defeats, impairs, impedes or prejudices
the rights of a party.' "Id. (quoting Great Neck Pennysaver, Inc. v. Central Nassau
Publications, 409 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (App. Div. 1978).
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obeyed unless they are stayed, vacated or reversed. 120 Similarly,
attorneys who may know an order is erroneous are not relieved
of their duty to obey it. Rather, they must stay the order or
comply with it, and then cite the order as reversible error on appeal. 12' An attorney may not "test case" the law by defying a
court order only to later avoid a contempt adjudication with a
claim that he was a "Roe" plaintiff "test casing" the law for the
benefit of others similarly situated." A litigant may not unilaterally disregard an order merely because he believes, in good
faith, that the order is defective, misguided, or erroneous.12 So
long as the court has jurisdiction, and its order is not void on its
face, the order must be obeyed no matter how erroneous it may
12

be.

The validity of an order resulting from an adjudication of
criminal contempt, which is designed to vindicate judicial
authority through punishment, may not be challenged for the
first time on appeal unless the order was void on its face, transparently invalid or frivolous; or it was issued by a tribunal lacking subject matter and in personam jurisdiction.'
Moreover, if
an order is disobeyed, the party in violation may still be held in
contempt despite his later success in obtaining its reversal on

120

See State v. Congress of Racial Equality, 460 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60-61 (App. Div.

1983) (holding that a civil contempt fine was unwarranted because a civil contempt
is merely remedial in nature unlike criminal contempt which is imposed to preserve
the power of the court and therefore must be obeyed, even if it is later found to be
erroneous).
121See Chapman, 613 F.2d at 197 (noting that an attorney's
competence to
practice law includes the "obligation to comply with a court order").
122 See United States v. Cutler, 840 F. Supp. 959, 965 (E.D.N.Y.
1994), affd, 58
F.3d 825 (1995) (holding that an attorney could not willfully disobey a judge's order
and then assert that the judge was legally wrong in making the order).
2'See Sigmoil Resources N.V.v. Fabbri, 644 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (App. Div. 1996)
(stating that a party's good faith belief that an order is defective is an insufficient
basis upon which they may then unilaterally disregard such an order).
124 See Sigmoil Resources N.V., 644 N.Y.S.2d at 505; see
also Department of Labor OSHA v. Hem Iron Works, Inc. (In re Establishment Inspection of Hem Iron
Works Inc.), 881 F.2d 722, 725- (9th Cir. 1989) ("In brief, the collateral bar rule
permits a judicial order to be enforced through criminal contempt even though the
underlying decision may be incorrect and even unconstitutional.").
122See St. Regis Mohawk Dev. Corp. v. Cook, 581 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 1992)
(quoting Bergin v. Peplowski, 569 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div. 1991)). In Bergin, the
court held "[ain appeal from a contempt order which is jurisdictionally valid does
not bring up for review the prior order." Id. at 846; City Sch. Dist. of Schenectady v.
Schenectady Fed'n of Teachers, 375 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (App. Div. 1975) (noting
same).
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appeal. 2 ' Furthermore, it is not a defense that the order was
being appealed at the time it was disobeyed. If the order was not
stayed during the pendency of the appeal, the requirement of
obedience is the same as though no appeal was taken at all.27
Reversal of an order does not, in any way, alter the fact that
a criminal contempt has occurred. Otherwise, the "orderly administration of justice [would] be thrown into chaos."' On appeal from a contempt adjudication, a contemnor may not urge
facts or arguments which might have previously led to an order's
modification or its vacatur."9 The contemnor may never allege
as a defense that the court erred in its judgment."30 Instead, he
must prove, in point of law, that the order was void or delivered
131
by a court lacking subject matter and in personam jurisdiction,
and the order in question must be stayed, vacated or determined
to be the subject of a direct appeal for review. It may not later
be attacked collaterally. 132 Occasionally, a contemnor does not
appeal an order, but rather attempts to use his appeal from a
contempt adjudication as a means to revive abandoned challenges to that order. He will not be successful, however, because
his right to do so terminated with his failure to appeal.lu
There are several qualifications to the collateral bar rule
126 See

Brown v. Ramsey (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1180 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating

that a court's order must be obeyed even if later reversed, unless one can get a stay
on the order).
127 See People ex rel. Day v. Bergen, 53 N.Y. 404, 410 (1873) (noting that because
the order was not void, "it [could not] be reviewed upon an application to punish for
a disobedience of it").
128In re Cost, 100 N.Y.S.2d 993, 993 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 101 N.Y.S.2d
737 (App.
Div. 1950), affd 109 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1952); see also Hem Iron Works Inc., 881 F.2d
at 726 (noting that "the orderly fumctioning of the judicial system necessitate[s]
prompt adherence" to a court order, without which would jeopardize the "smoothly
Mrun]udicial process").
See Geller v. Flamount Realty Corp., 183 N.E. 520, 522 (N.Y. 1932) (stating
that the court will not hear arguments which could have been raised earlier and
apply them retroactively to reverse the order).
1soSee People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263, 266 (1853) (discussing
the
point that a party cannot disobey a court order and allege that the court made an
error in judgment).
131 See id. at 266-67.
13 See id. (noting that a court decision, whether right or wrong, may be questioned only upon a direct proceeding to review it, and may not be challenged collatera%1,.See People ex rel. Sassower v. Cunningham,
492 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (App. Div.
1985) (stating that the petitioner may not use a contempt order to revive an opportunity to appeal the underlying order after the time to do so has lapsed).
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which courts have enunciated. First, orders issued without personal or subject matter jurisdiction may be violated without incurring contempt liability. This recognizes that an order issued
by a court "without jurisdiction to entertain [an application for]
and then grant a provisional remedy ... in connection with [a]

cause of action" manifestly lacks validity and therefore precludes
the imposition of punishable contempt for disobedience thereunder."M Second, a transparently invalid, void, or frivolous order
may likewise be violated without risk.135 This is founded upon
the proposition that contempt power is not a vehicle for a court
to exceed its authority. A court with jurisdiction is nevertheless
prohibited from "reduc[ing] constitutional rights without a colorable basis in the law."" 6 Third:
the collateral bar rule presupposes that adequate and effective
remedies exist for [the] orderly review of the challenged ruling;
in the absence of such an opportunity for review, [a contemnor]
may challenge the validity of the disobeyed order on appeal
from his criminal contempt conviction
and escape punishment if
13 7
[the] order is deemed [to be] invalid.

Fourth, an order must not require the "irretrievable surrender"
of constitutional rights. 38 "In such a case, the only way to preserve a challenge to the validity of the order and repair the error
is to violate the order and contest its validity on appeal" from a
contempt adjudication.1 39 Fifth, if an order "requires the surrender of rights or privileges not grounded in the Constitution that
protect individuals from the revelation of privileged information,
such as the attorney-client privilege, ... [and] 'disclosure would
cause irreparable injury' ... noncompliance is justified" subject to
134Schulz

v. State, 654 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (N.Y. 1995) (holding a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction cannot hold a party in contempt for disobedience of its
order).
135 See In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397,
1401-02 (11th Cir. 1991).
'38Hem Iron Works Inc., 881 F.2d at 727.
137 Novak, 932 F.2d
at 1401.

United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972)
[Tihe rule that unconstitutional court orders must nevertheless be
obeyed until set aside presupposes the existence of at least three conditions: (i) the court issuing the injunction must enjoy subject matter
and personal jurisdiction over the controversy; (ii) adequate and effective remedies must be available for orderly review of the challenged
ruling, and (iii) the order must require an irretrievable surrender of
constitutional guarantees.
Id. (citations omitted).
138

"'9Novak, 932 F.2d at 1401-02.
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possible vindication on appeal." Sixth, at the trial level, where
compelled testimony does not automatically result in testimonial
immunity and the Fifth Amendment privilege is asserted in good
faith upon reasonable grounds, disobedience of a direction to
testify is subject to attack for the first time on appeal.'
This is
not applicable, however, when the Fourth Amendment is involved and the contempt order, for the first time on appeal following disobedience, is traced to an invalid search warrant, or
when the disobedience is to ex parte injunctions involving First
Amendment speech rights. In the case of the Fifth Amendment
and other legally privileged information, the person compelled is
part of the process of the court's order and the "cat cannot be put
back in the bag." In First and Fourth Amendment ex parte order
situations, the party is not forced to give information and his
42
rights may be vindicated through the law's ordinary process.
Lastly, the collateral bar rule distinguishes between criminal
and civil contempt based on the fundamental distinction between
the two." Except for void, frivolous or transparently invalid orders and those issued without in personam or subject matter jurisdiction, a civil contempt, unlike a criminal contempt which issues its binding orders pursuant to its inherent authority to do
so, always depends upon the legality and authority of the court
to issue the order in the first instance.'" A party may be held in
civil and criminal contempt for violation of an order. On appeal,
the order may be reversed for any number of reasons other than
voidness or jurisdiction, such that the civil contempt, but not the
criminal contempt, will be vacated because there is nothing to
140Id. at 1401 n.7 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 169 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
141 See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-68 (1975) (holding that an attorney
is not subject to a contempt penalty for advising his client in good faith to assert the
Fifth Amendment against an order to produce material demanded by a subpoena
duces tecum).
142 See Hem Iron Works Inc., 881 F.2d at 728 ("Although
several commentators
have argued for the application of the Maness exception to deliberate violations of ex
parte injunctions restraining First Amendment speech rights, ... thus far, the exception has not been extended beyond the limited confines of self-incrimination.")
(citations omitted).
43 See United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
487 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1988) (noting that differential treatment between criminal and
civil contempt is based upon the fact that the two types of orders serve different
purposes and necessities).
See id. at 76-79.
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coerce anymore while there is plenty remaining to punish.'4 5
SECTION 14: ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER
A court order should not command persons to do something
which is entirely beyond their power. 45 The ability to comply
with a court's order is critical in determining whether it has been
intentionally disobeyed, and when placed in issue, a party's inability to comply with an order must be thoroughly explored.'4 7
Such a defense is tested in contempt proceedings after noncompliance with an order, a subpoena duces tecum, or a turnover
order in a bankruptcy proceeding. 4 The defense has permutations. For example, a good faith effort to comply with a court order negates an intention to disobey." However, good faith does
not equate with a privilege to second guess an order's propriety.
145 See id. at 78-79 (distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt as having different purposes of coercion and punishment, respectively); Department of
Envtl. Protection of New York v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of New York,
513 N.E.2d 706, 709 (N.Y. 1987) (stating that civil contempt is designed to compensate the injured party or to coerce a party to comply with a court order, while criminal contempt is used to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to compel
respect to the court).
146 See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir.
1997) (noting that, despite the court's broad discretion, its power is not unlimited,
and therefore the court cannot hold persons in contempt for violating decrees they
are unable to comply with because the matter is beyond their control).
147 See Foley v. Foley, 422 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (App. Div. 1979)
(finding that a de
novo hearing was necessary to establish whether contemptible conduct was willful);
Genuth v. Hynes, 384 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (App. Div. 1976) (explaining that the argument for the inability to comply with a subpoena duces tecum could be considered
on a motion to punish for contempt); In re Wegman, 57 N.Y.S. 987, 989 (App. Div.
1899) (holding that the issue of willful disobedience must be determined by taking
into account the contemnor's power to comply with the court's order).
148 See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948) (positing that precaution
should be taken in issuing a turnover order against an estate's trustee by first determining the power of the coerced party to comply); United States v. Patterson, 219
F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that no individual may refuse to produce
documents if they are in his control); Robertson v. Berger (In re Arctic Leather
Garment Co.), 89 F.2d 871, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1937) (finding that the order to surrender possession of certain books was supported adequately by a determination that
the party could comply with the order); Kuriansky v. Azam, 575 N.Y.S.2d 679, 68081 (App. Div. 1991) (reasoning that a presumption of control over the subpoenaed
documents was sufficient to support criminal contempt of the compelled party);
Genuth, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (stating that a party's "claim that [they do] not possess
the documents ... may be tested on a motion to punish for contempt").
149 See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950) (discussing that certain exceptions exist for failure to comply with a subpoena when there is a "very
real interest" to be protected); United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116, 1126 (7th Cir.
1982) (stating that a good faith effort "tends to negate willfullness").
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"In most instances, a defense of good faith compliance arises
when ... fail[ure] to comply [is due to] the indefiniteness of the
order ..." or the existence of conditions beyond the individual's

control.' Once a prima facie case of contempt is established, the
burden shifts to the alleged contemnor who must then come forward, with more than mere assertion, with evidence of a present
inability to comply.' 5 ' In some instances, the burden may be
52
satisfied by the making of all reasonable efforts to comply.
Substantial or diligent effort is not enough, even if performed in
good faith. Only a showing that every reasonable effort was
made will suffice. Otherwise, a lesser standard would dilute the
order's command.'53 Self-induced inability to comply is never a
defense.5 Individuals who, after receipt of compulsory process,
render compliance impossible are punishable for criminal contempt, but they may not be coerced with civil contempt sanctions. 55
"o Ray, 683 F.2d at 1126; see also United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1526
(10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that if the inability to comply results from the failure to
take action within the individual's power, then the individual may be held in con-

tempt).
See Piambino v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (stating that to establish a defense of inability to comply, the contemnor must
proceed beyond a "bald assertion" of inability).
162See id. (quoting Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970, 984 (11th
Cir.
1986)).
'5 For example, the court held in Powers v. Powers, 653 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y.
1995), that the respondent, who alleged that he was unable to meet his child support obligation, did not satisfy the burden necessary to establish his inability to pay
merely by claiming that he had exhausted his funds and by offering "no credible evidence indicating the necessity for placing his alleged expenses ahead of support
payments." Id. at 1158; see also United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 534 (1971)
(stating that the subpoena served on the respondent placed on him "a duty to make
in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply with it"); Huber v. Marine Midland
Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "if [one] 'offers no evidence as to his
inability to comply ... or stands mute,' [one] has not met [the] burden") (quoting
Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75-76 (1948)); Combs, 785 F.2d at 984 (ruling that the
phrase "in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply" is to be strictly construed)
(quoting United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976)).
'6 See, e.g., Bryan, 339 U.S. at 330-31 (explAining that responsibility for the
failure to comply is not a defense to a charge of contempt); United States v. Asay,
614 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating an exception exists to the defense of inability to comply when "the person charged is responsible for the inability to comply"); People ex rel. Day v. Bergen, 53 N.Y. 404, 410-11 (1873) (holding that a contemnor cannot use the inability defense against disobedience of the court's order if it
was a result of his own actions).
'm See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 251 (1972) ("Civil contempt is coercive in nature, and consequently there is no justification for confining
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SECTION 15: ORDERS AND THIRD-PARTY ADVICE

The law does not allow the instigator of contemptuous conduct to absolve himself of contempt liability by leaving the physical performance of the forbidden conduct to others. "[Tihose who
have knowledge of a valid court order [and then counsel, advise
or] abet others in violating it are subject to" punishment for contempt. 5 ' "Incitement and execution are touched with equal
guilt."'57 One who aids, procures or advises the disobedience of a
subpoena after it has been served, or has knowledge that it is
about to be served on a person, is equally guilty with the one who
actually disobeys it. 5 '
Attorneys present a subtlety. An attorney may advise a client towards a course of action that seems to be consistent with
the language in a court's order by interpreting the order's
meaning and validity. Even if the advice is erroneous, the attorney may not be held in contempt unless, rather than merely advising the client of the order's meaning and validity, the attorney
exceeds his limitation and counsels the client to disregard or
disobey the order. "9 Ordinarily, if the attorney acts in good faith
and with the honest belief that the advice is well founded and in
the legally cognizable interests of the client, the attorney's advice
on a civil contempt theory a person who lacks the present ability to comply.");
Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding
that an attorney, who no longer represents a client in a case where the attorney was
held liable for noncompliance with a discovery order, cannot be held liable for civil
contempt since civil contempt is essentially a coercive sanction and the attorney no
longer has the ability to comply with the order).
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990); see also King v.
Barnes, 21 N.E. 182, 182-83 (N.Y. 1889) (finding defendant in contempt for aiding in
the company officers' disobedience of the lower court's judgment).
"' People v. Emieleta, 144 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1924). See United States v.
Terry, 815 F. Supp. 728, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 17 F.3d 575 (2d Cir. 1994)
(explaining that one who aids another with the necessary intent is liable for the act
of the other).
'5 See People ex rel. Drake v. Andrews, 90 N.E. 347, 348 (N.Y. 1909) ("[Olne
who aids, procures, or advises the disobedience of a lawful mandate of the court is
equally guilty with him who actually disobeys it.") (citing King v. Barnes, 21 N.E.
182 (N.Y. 1889)).
'" See In re Landau, 243 N.Y.S. 732, 735-36 (App. Div. 1930) (finding appellant
attorney not in contempt for the advice he rendered to his client with regard to a
court order prohibiting the issuance of certain bonds because he refrained from advising his client to disobey the order); see also Waste Conversion Inc. v. Rollins
Envtl. Serv. (NJ), Inc., 893 F.2d 605, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1990) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (reasoning that judges must be "scrupulously careful" to protect the alleged
contemnor's procedural and substantive rights, and that giving bad legal advice is
not the equivalent of contemptuous conduct).
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is not the fodder of contempt. "The preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital to the due administration of justice to allow ...
the application of any other general rule."60 In

the courtroom, the general rule is that once a court has ruled, its
order must be obeyed even though an objection may be made.
That is why appellate courts exist. 6 ' However, a lawyer who in
good faith advises clients to assert the Fifth Amendment in opposition to a trial subpoena duces tecum, where immunity would
not by operation of law attend production, is not subject to contempt. 16 2

The

Fifth Amendment

privilege

against

self-

incrimination would be meaningless if an attorney in good faith
could not advise clients to assert it. The right to counsel includes the right to counsel's advice.'63 But the role of counsel is
limited to that of good faith advisor. If the attorney uses his or
her license to advise with the intent to further a criminal enterprise, obstruct justice or obstruct an ongoing trial, the attorneymay face disciplinary sanctions, contempt of court, or imprisonment.' Additionally, an attorney whose intentional conduct or
willful neglect of an order is the cause of a client's disobedience
may be held in contempt.'6

163 In

re Watts & Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903); see also Davis v. Goodson, 635

S.W.2d 226, 227 (Ark. 1982) (holding an attorney in contempt for specifically advising his client to disregard a court order during open court).
'6'
See Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1975) (discussing the necessity of
orderly process to the workings of the adversarial system and the general reparability of injury caused by judicial error).
1'6See

id. at 458, 464-65.

See id. at 471-72 (Stewart, J., concurring).
164 See id. at 459-60; see also United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 995 (1st Cir.
16

1987) (holding an attorney in contempt for influencing, obstructing and impeding
the administration ofjustice by befouling a federal grand jury investigation); United
States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding the defendant in contempt for influencing a witness in a grand jury proceeding by threats and intimidation); Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 443 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding coercion or
corruptive advisement of a witness to claim his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination is an obstruction of the due administration of justice); People ex rel.
Vogelstein v. Warden, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 371 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (holding an attorney in
contempt for his refusal, on privilege grounds, to testify as to the name of the person
who employed him to represent the defendants in a grand jury proceeding), affd,
271 N.Y.S. 1059 (App. Div. 1934).
'6' See Kanbar v. Quad Cinema Corp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (App. Div. 1993)
(noting that an attorney may be held in contempt for willful neglect or refusal to
follow an order, which resulted in the client's disobedience of such order, while
finding that the defendant attorney was not willfully neglectful since his failure to
inform his clients of the notice was not deliberate).
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SECTION 16: INTENT, ADVICE OF COUNSEL AND CONTEMPT

In establishing intent, it is sufficient to find that a refusal to
obey was the product of rational choice. The fact that the ra-

tional choice is predicated on the advice of counsel is irrelevant. 9 The same result occurs even when disobedience is based
upon one's religious beliefs. 7 The invocation of First Amendment protection as a defense to intentional contempt is intolerable in a civilized society. In relying on this defense, one assumes the risk of an adverse decision in a contempt proceeding.
The fact that a contemnor subjectively intended no harm or
disrespect is irrelevant to the question of the contemnor's intent.
The due administration of justice in a society under law demands this. 6 ' To allow such a "white heart" defense would destroy the power of courts to compel obedience and punish disobedience. 69 While cooperation with one's lawyer is important
and should be encouraged, an "attorney may not exculpate his
client of contempt by advising him to disobey an order of the
'r' See People v. Marcus, 185 N.E. 97, 104-05 (N.Y. 1933) (finding defendant's
reliance on his attorney's advice, regarding an illegal application of funds and a resultant loss, constitutes an insufficient defense to charges of misappropriation of
funds); People v. Dercole, 424 N.Y.S.2d 459, 469-70 (App. Div. 1980) (stating the
general rule that reliance on advice of counsel is not a sufficient defense to a criminal contempt charge nor is it relevant to the issue of intent); In re Grand Jury
(Cioffi), 202 N.Y.S.2d 26, 39 (App. Div.) (finding appellants in contempt for willfully
refusing to testify during grand jury proceedings, irrespective of their claimed reliance on counsel's advice), affd, 168 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1960); People v Breindel, 342
N.Y.S.2d 428,433 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (finding intent on the part of defendant to commit
contempt, irrespective of defendant's reliance on the advice of his attorney to so act),
affd, 356 N.Y.S.2d 626 (App. Div.), affd, 324 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1974).
" See People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789-90 (App. Div. 1966) (finding
appellant's religious beliefs must yield to the dominant state interest of maintaining
order and peace and, therefore, appellant, who refused to testify claiming that to do
so would violate her religious beliefs, was in contempt), affd, 236 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y.
1968); In re Fuhrer, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429-30 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (directing a Rabbi to
testify although he claimed that to do so would subject him to possible excommunication), affd sub nom. Fuhrer v. Hynes, 421 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 1979).
'as See United States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 707 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Contempt is a knowing and willing violation of a valid court order .... If everyone
was free to disobey lawful court orders until they were ratified by some other tribunal, the result would be anarchy and disorder."); People ex rel. Springs v. Reid, 124
N.Y.S. 205, 209 (App. Div. 1910) (finding punishment of defendant for contempt
just, regardless of his claim of innocent reliance on alleged advice of counsel and his
proclaimed lack of intent to willfully disregard court process).
6'See Department of Envtl. Protection of New York v. Department of Envtl.
Conservation of New York, 513 N.E.2d 706, 711 (N.Y. 1987) (finding that, if contemptuous actions taken on reliance of legal advice went unpunished, judicial orders
would be evaded too easily and disobeyed).
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court because the judge is 'wrong.' "'7 The responsibility of
complying or not complying with a court order rests solely with
the person commanded.'
Viewed cynically, a defense to contempt based on advice of counsel is an invitation to every sophisticated scoundrel to seek an attorney who will give advice
that he or she need not obey the order and thus be safe in the
expectation that there will be immunity from the consequences
of the disobedience. 72 While "advice of counsel ...
may be consid-

ered in mitigation of punishment," the law of contempt is not "so
complex ...as to set it apart from the rest of criminal law to
which 'ignorance ...
is no defense.' ",' As a matter of policy, soci-

ety abhors placing a premium on ignorance or experimentation
with disobedience and, thus, counsers mistaken view of the law
is no defense." One cannot be allowed to excuse derelictions by
asserting reliance on the advice of others.'75 Otherwise, a defen170United States v. Monteleone, 804 F.2d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 1986).

...
See People v. D'Amato, 211 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880-81 (App. Div. 1961) (explaining
the well-settled principle that responsibility for obedience to an order of the court
rests with the person charged and the authority so charging); People v. Forsyth, 439
N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that the impossibility defense is not
available to a defendant who is responsible for his inability to comply).
172 See People v. Einhorn, 356 N.Y.S.2d 620, 625 (App. Div.) (Steuer,
J., dissenting) (noting the possible result of allowing a contemnor to escape contempt liability
based on his reliance on counsel's advice to act contemptuously), rev'd on other
grounds, 324 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1974).
1"3United States v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754, 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Goldfarb, 167 F.2d 735, 735 (2d Cir. 1948) (per curiam)).
'
See id. at 757; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929), overruled
by United States v. Guadin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995); see also Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S.
449, 459-460 (1975) (noting that a lawyer who advises his client against complying
with an order of the trial court subjects his client to punishment for contempt and
exposes himself or herself to sanctions for trial obstructions); SEC v. Musella, 818 F.
Supp. 600, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that the contemnor may not rely on his own
inadvertence, misunderstanding or advice from counsel as a defense to contempt).
But see Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding this inquiry necessary to evaluate whether a criminal defendant may be punished for the errors of
an attorney under the rule established by the Supreme Court in Taylor v.Illinois,
484 U.S. 400 (1988)--"[a]lthough the Supreme Court held that certain willful misconduct by an attorney may permissibly be imputed to the attorney's client, such
may not be the case when the attorney's error is the product of mere inadvertence
or even gross negligence.") (citations omitted).
175 See Butterly v. Lomenzo, 326 N.E.2d 799, 803 (N.Y. 1975)
(noting that reliance on advice of counsel is not an excuse for disobeying a subpoena because public
policy supports holding individuals responsible for obeying laws); Reid, 124 N.Y.S.
at 209. There may be occasions where a lawyer may actually testify that he did not
advise his client of a court's order as a means of exoneration. The courts, in such a
curious instance, might view such testimony generously on behalf of its proponent.
But see United States v. Revie, 834 F.2d 1198, 1202-03 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that
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dant would be entitled to assert a defense that could arguably be
called "the public official defense."
SECTION

17: DURESS

In some circumstances, duress may serve as an equitable defense to contempt. In these instances, the duress must consist of
"palpable imminent danger.' ' 178 Fear alone does not suffice as a

legal justification for disobeying a court order. 177 With regard to
an immunized prisoner, fear of reprisal gives him "no more dispensation from testifying than it does any innocent bystander
without a record" an excuse not to testify. 178 The courts have
thus far failed to express the rationale of this principle. Ultimately, it is a matter of sound policy. If the law has a right to
"every man's evidence,"'79 it is the court, and not some nameless
thug, who must be the final arbiter of the duty to testify.
SECTION 18: WILLFULNESS

The words "willful" and "willfully," wherever they appear in
any criminal contempt statute or opinion, should be changed to
"intentional" or "intentionally." Criminal contempt is premised
on intentional disobedience, not disobedience with an attitude.
'Willful" and "willfully" in addition to sparking a constant battle
over how many "l's" should appear in their respective spellings,
subliminally import moral disapprobation into criminal contempt's mens rea. This phenomenon is the antithesis of objectivity. It invites both the uncertainty and excuse of subjectivity. In
the mind's eye of some, a willful child is merely a high-spirited
to do so would create the ability to avoid contempt charges simply based on the attorney's assertion that no advice was given to the client).
176 In re Grand Jury Proceedings of December, 1989, 903 F.2d 1167, 1170 (7th
Cir. 1990) (noting that for a witness to be excused from testifying due to duress, he
"must demonstrate that due to this overwhelming sense of immediate danger, he 'is
unable to act freely, to testify, and thus to purge himself of his contempt'") (quoting
In re Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988 (Freligh), 894 F.2d 881, 884
(7th Cir. 1989)).
17 See Dupuy v. United Staies, 518 F.2d 1295, 1295 (9th Cir. 1975).
178 Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961); see also United
States v. Doe, 125 F.3d 1249, 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that "[a] witness
who has been granted immunity and has been ordered to testify must do so or risk
punishment for criminal contempt"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1100 (1998); United
States v. Winter, 70 F.3d 655, 665-66 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing that fear of reprisal
as a basis for refusing to testify, at best, may be potentially relevant in mitigating
the contemnor's sentence).
1 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (citation omitted).
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child, while in the perception of others, he is a little bastard.
Case law generally equates "willful" with "intentional" although,
in dicta, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that "the
element which serves to elevate a contempt from civil to criminal
is the level of willfulness with which the conduct is carried
out."18 This is conceptual nonsense worthy of a philosophy class
dropout. How can one be more or less willful than willful? Historically, in New York, willfulness was equated with intentional
conduct for contempt purposes.' 8'
SECTION 19: REFUSAL TO BE SWORN AS CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

A refusal to be sworn may take various forms. In law and
theory, a refusal to be sworn may occur anywhere depending on
circumstances. For instance, a refusal to be sworn may occur
"in" the grand jury room, while the act of voicing the refusal actually occurs in front of the judge who just ordered the witness to
go back in the grand jury room to be sworn and testify.'82 As
more fully discussed above, it matters not in which room of the
courthouse a contemnor takes his stand for purposes of felony as
opposed to misdemeanor contempt liability." Some who refuse
to be sworn are more brashly circuitous than they are successful.
A grand jury witness who, in order to consult his attorney, repeatedly refuses to be sworn and states that he will not testify
with the prosecutor in the room is subject to prosecution for con-

McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583 (1983) (per curiam).
See People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 4 N.E. 259, 260 (N.Y.
1886) (discussing willfulness or evil intention as a necessary element of criminaf
contempt); People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y. 402, 406 (1882) (discussing willful
disobedience as the element of criminal contempt that distinguishes it from civil
contempt).
182 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (noting the
grand jury's power to subpoena a
witness is fundamental to fulfilling its obligation expressed through "the longstanding principle that 'the public ... has a right to enjoy every man's evidence' except for
those persons protected by a constitutional, common law or statutory privilege")
(quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
"3 Compare People v. Ruggiano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731-32 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
(finding defendant guilty of felony contempt for his refusal to appear before the
grand jury even though violation would normally impose only misdemeanor liability,
since the purpose of defendant's actions was to avoid the felony charges that would
have been imposed for his refusal to be sworn as a witness once physically before
the grand jury), with People v. DiMaria, 481 N.Y.S.2d 244, 249-50 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
(stating that defendant's contemptuous conduct was elevated to a felony by refusing
to be sworn as a witness once physically appearing before the grand jury).
'8'
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tempt."' While a proclaimed refusal clearly indicates intent, it
would be equally clear if a witness walked out of a legal proceeding before being sworn.'8
Under New York Penal Law, a subpoenaed witness who
disobeys a subpoena by simply staying home on the subpoena's
return date is properly and only chargeable with contempt as a
misdemeanor.186 On the other hand, if he appears before the
grand jury and refuses to be sworn he incurs felony contempt liability. 187 While at first blush it may seem harsh to impose felony liability for the failure to appear before a grand jury, this
concern may encompass too much. Those who ignore the grand
jury's subpoena suffer less penal consequences than those who
appear. The potential consequences posed by either a nonappearance or an appearance with a refusal to be sworn, places
counsel in a difficult position. Counsel is bound to move to
quash the subpoena or advise obedience thereunder. Whatever
may be said of equitable arguments, it appears certain that New
York's present statutory scheme perversely "rewards" nonappearance and punishes appearance in response to grand jury
subpoenas. This quirk in the law has not escaped the notice of
wily contemnors who occasionally assert a "geographic defense"
to felony contempt by refusing to be sworn in a place other than
See Levine v. De Cesare, 312 N.Y.S.2d 39, 39 (3d Dep't 1970) (affirming decision to hold defendant in contempt for refusal to be sworn before the grand jury and
finding that he was not entitled to have his attorney present in the grand jury room
nor was he entitled to an adjournment because he had ample time to consult with
his attorney prior to the proceeding).
'85
See Bryan, 339 U.S. at 329-30 (stating that it is the refusal to comply with
the order and not the manner in which it was done that constitutes contempt); see
also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689-92 (refusing to grant a special exception for newsgatherers and their anonymous sources in grand jury proceedings involving questions relevant to a criminal investigation); United States v. Allen, 73 F.3d 64, 68
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant's intentional efforts to avoid service of a subpoena constituted a willful disobedience of a specific order, and hence criminal contempt); People ex rel. Keeler v. McDonald, 2 N.E. 615, 625-26 (N.Y. 1885) (finding a
realtor in contempt because hie was called to testify before a state senate committee
and he answered some questions but refused to answer others, then refused further
examination and left the committee room).
'88See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50(3) (McKinney 1988) ("A person is guilty of
criminal contempt in the second degree when he engages in ...
[i]ntentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court .
'7See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51(a) ("A person is guilty of criminal contempt in
the first degree when ...
he contumaciosly and unlawfully refuses to be sworn as a
witness before a grand jury, or, when after having been sworn as a witness before a
1"4

grand jury, he refuses to answer any legal and proper interrogatory

.... ").
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the physical presence of the grand jury. Likewise, prosecutors
will counter such tactics with court orders authorizing bodily seizure to transport such an individual into the grand jury room in
order to subject the witness to felony liability should he persist
in refusing to be sworn.'88
The same type of disparity is present when comparing the
felony contempt liability that attaches to a refusal to be sworn
and testify before a grand jury, with the misdemeanor contempt
liability that attaches to the same conduct during a trial.'8 9 Specifically, the grand jury utilizes a reasonable cause standard of
proof in its proceedings, which are merely accusatory in nature.
However, at the adjudicatory phase before a petit jury the standard applied is "beyond a reasonable doubt."8 ' Consequently,
one might argue that New York's Penal Law has its punitive priorities reversed.
SECTION 20: THE MENS REA OF TESTIMONIAL CONTEMPT
Generally, the mens rea of testimonial criminal contempt
exhibits itself in a refusal to testify before a grand jury or public
commission. The issue is much less likely to arise at trial where
the parties, for the most part, know and control the witnesses
whom they are calling to the witness stand. Despite the fact
that the Penal and Judiciary Laws pertaining to testimonial contempt's mens rea are cast solely in terms of an intentional refusal to answer, phrases such as "willfulness" and "tending to
obstruct" have been used to define it. The process is done blindly
without question or examination. To the extent "willfulness" is
synonymous with "knowing and intentional," it adds nothing of
13

See DiMaria, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 248-50 (upholding a custodial order by the

court to bring the defendant before the grand jury, when the defendant appeared for
a bench warrant and refused to be brought before the grand jury). In rejecting the
defendant's claim that the procedures were orchestrated by the prosecution in order
to elevate the level of charges, the court stated that "Itihe defendant 'elevated' his
contemptuous conduct to a felony, when having bodily appeared before the Grand
Jury.. he refused to be sworn." Id. at 249.
Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51 with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50(4) (defining criminal contempt in the second degree as "unlawful refusal to be sworn as a
witness in any court proceeding or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and
proper interrogatory").
9' See People v. Calbud, Inc., 402 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing the
requirement for the higher burden of proof that resides with the petit jury, because
the petit jury determines ultimate guilt or innocence, whereas the grand jury
merely serves as an accusatory instrument).
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intelligible substance to an intentional refusal to answer.
"Tendency to obstruct," and like phrases, too often are used imprecisely and needlessly. Obviously, testimonial contempt necessarily and foreseeably obstructs inquiry, but obstruction is the
effect, and not the mens rea, of what is intended. The distinction
between testimonial contempt by evasive answer and flat refusal
to answer illustrates the point.
Evidence concerning intent and state of mind at the time of
interrogation is relevant to the issue of whether an answer is
evasive.' 9 ' Evidence of state of mind relates to intent, and not to
obstruction, which has nevertheless occurred. A defendant on
trial for criminal contempt is not entitled to a jury charge that
the prosecution must establish an intent to obstruct.'92 However,
it is erroneous to exclude proof concerning his state of mind. 9 '
Evasive contempt is a method of refusing to answer, but to hold
that the evasive witness simultaneously harbors an intent to obstruct inquiry does not justify a conclusion that obstruction is
part of evasive contempt's mens rea.
A flat refusal to answer, or a refusal to answer on legal
grounds previously declared meritless, is an intentional refusal
to answer."M The contemptuous witness may be well coached or
sincerely misguided as to issues pending on appeal at the time
he refuses to testify and may not harbor the slightest
intention
9 5
to obstruct. Nevertheless, he is guilty of contempt.
191See People v. Martin, 367 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 366 N.E.2d
881 (N.Y. 1977) (ordering a new trial because the trial court erroneously refused to
consider evidence concerning the "defendant's intent and state of mind when he
testified before the Grand Jury"); People v. Renaghan, 338 N.Y.S.2d 125, 128 (1st

Dep't 1972) (reversing a contempt conviction because intent to obstruct justice was
not shown), affd, 309 N.E.2d 425 (N.Y. 1974).
192See People v. Tantleff, 356 N.E.2d 477, 477 (1976).
'0 See Martin, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
194 See Keenan v. Gigante, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1155-56 (N.Y. 1979) (holding a
priest in contempt for refusing to answer questions based on a priest-penitent
privilege that the court held did not apply); People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549
(N.Y. 1978) (finding that a defendant was precluded from raising the illegality of the
wiretap as a defense to a contempt charge where he had previously answered questions falsely or evasively); In re Grand Jury (Cioffi), 168 N.E.2d 663, 665 (N.Y. 1960)
(holding a witness, who had been granted immunity, in contempt for appearing before the grand jury but refusing to answer questions regarding his employment);
DiBiasi v. Schweitzer, 253 N.Y.S.2d 425, 435 (App. Div. 1964) (finding witness in
contempt, despite grant of immunity, for refusing to testify).
'95See Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) (noting that the
fear of retaliation is not sufficient to defend against a charge of contempt for remaining silent where a witness has been granted immunity); United States v.
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SECTION 21: EvASIVE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, WHAT IS IT?

Criminal contempt by evasive answer, whether prosecuted
under the Judiciary or Penal Law, has always been the subject of
semantic formulations. The proverbial last word from the Court
of Appeals and other courts will never be anymore or less proverbial, given the wisdom and world perspective of the law

clerk-with three years of law school behind her or him-who
prepares the court's bench memorandum. This, and other areas
of bedrock law, produce a strong argument for the hiring of law

clerks, at suitable compensation, who have been practicing for a
minimum of ten years.
Evasive contempt's judicial formulations are distinct, similar, overlapping, and conceptually contradictory.
May the
Remini, 967 F.2d 754, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that following advice of counsel
to remain silent is not a legitimate defense against a charge of contempt); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Detroit Police Special Cash Fund), 922 F.2d 1266, 127273 (6th Cir. 1991) (deciding that fear for one's own safety or the safety of others is
not sufficient to avoid testifying). The court in DetroitPolice Special Cash Fund also
held "the informer's privilege ... inapplicable to state or local governments seeking
to withhold information from federal grand juries." Id. at 1272; see also Grand Jury
Witness v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 776 F.2d 1099, 1102-04 (2d
Cir. 1985) (deciding that the First Amendment does not protect members of an organization which is the focus of a legitimate investigation from having to testify regarding its organizational activities); Dupuy v. United States, 518 F.2d 1295, 1295
(9th Cir. 1975) (holding that fear of threats made by fellow prisoners for testifying
does not relieve a witness from testifying, and the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination cannot be raised as a defense once immunity has been
granted); Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating fear
of "Divine punishment" for being labeled an "informer" within the Jewish community was not sufficient grounds for refusal to testify before a grand jury), vacated on
othergrounds 409 U.S. 944 (1972) (mem.); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
590 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that an order by a foreign court
not to produce records is not a defense to a charge of contempt for failing to produce
the records in accordance with a United States district court order); People v. Garlock, 202 N.E.2d 905, 905 (N.Y. 1964) (holding that wife could be held in contempt
for refusing to testify against her husband); People v. Clinton, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346
(App. Div. 1973) (holding witness's fear for her own life and her child's life was not
sufficient grounds for refusing to testify); People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789
(App. Div. 1966) (holding that fear of violating a religious tenet forbidding injuring
others did not absolve a witness from being required to testify), affd, 236 N.E.2d
159 (N.Y. 1968); People v. Gumbs, 478 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517-18 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding
that a witness who had not been called to testify because of his own criminal activity, who had refused police protection, and who had not actually been threatened,
could not raise fear for his own and his family's safety as a defense for refusing to
testify); In re Fuhrer, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431-32 (Sup. Ct.) (holding that a rabbi could
not raise the possibility of excommunication or loss of his ministry as a defense for
refusing to testify when he had been accused of participation in the illegal activities), affd, 421 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 1979).
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"witness... reasonably be said to have made a bona fide effort to
answer [?]" 9 The technique of evasion is the attempt to answer
questions in terms of probability or possibility, while never asserting certainty or reasonable assurance.'97 Did the witness respond to questions with answers unequivocal enough to allow for
a perjury indictment?198 Are answers " 'false and evasive profession[s] of an inability to recall' and hopelessly contradictory responses repeatedly changed or altered[?]"'99 Can the answers be
proven false by extrinsic evidence or are they so improbable, inconsistent, evasive, contradictory or obviously untruthful as to
constitute contempt?2" Are they self-evident falsehoods? °1 Are
they" 'so [inherently] false ... as to be equivalent to no answer at
all[?]' ,20 Is an answer perjurious on its face without resort to

extrinsic evidence and patently calculated to obstruct?0 " Does
the answer go "beyond ... raising ... an issue of credibility ... [?]"'04
Are answers "persistent equivocations ... despite earlier formal,

unqualified denials" such that they constitute "sophisticated
evasion [s?]"2"5 Is the response a "false and evasive profession of
'9 People v. Roseman, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1978, at 7 (Sup. Ct. July 6, 1978)
(noting court decision which held that a defendant had not made a valid attempt to
answer multiple questions regarding transactions with which he admitted he was
familiar) (citing United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
19 See People v. Paperno, 413 N.Y.S.2d 975, 980 (Sup. Ct. 1979),
rev'd, 432
N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1980) (noting that the test to establish evasiveness is
whether the witness made a bona fide effort to answer).
'98 See People v. Stahl, N.Y. L.J. Mar. 13, 1979, at 2, (Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 1979)
(citing People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 160 N.E.2d 647, 654 (1959)), affd, 427
N.Y.S.2d 895 (App. Div. 1980) (mem.), affd, 425 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1981).
19 People v. Schenkman, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (N.Y. 1978) (quoting People v.
Ianniello, 325 N.E.2d 146, 148 (N.Y. 1975)).
200 See People v. Tilotta, 375 N.Y.S.2d 965, 969 (Sup.
Ct. 1975) (holding that the
witness's testimony was so unbelievable and false on its face that the record alone
was sufficient proof for a finding of criminal contempt).
201 See Finkel v. McCook, 286 N.Y.S. 755, 760-62
(App. Div.) (discussing the effects of obviously untruthful statements and cases determining that obstruction is
an additional element), affd, 3 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1936). But see Steingut v. Imrie, 58
N.Y.S.2d 775, 779 (App. Div. 1945) (annulling a contempt conviction after finding
that the witness's responses were truthful and responsive).
2 In re Epstein, 252 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (quoting People
ex rel.
Valenti v. McCloskey, 160 N.E. 2d 647, 651 (N.Y. 1959)).
203 See In re Kamell, 11 N.Y.S.2d 479, 485 (Ct. Gen. Sess.) (finding that a witness's contradictory and evasive answers were attempts to block inquiry regarding
racketeering activities, affd mem. sub nom. Kamell v. Koenig 15 N.Y.S.2d 141
(App.Div. 1939).
People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 185 N.Y.S.2d 952, 957 (App. Div.), rev'd
on othergrounds, 160 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1959).
205 People v. Renaghan, 309 N.E.2d 425, 426 (N.Y. 1974) (Breitel, J., dissenting).
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an inability to recall... ?],,206 Other formulations involve patently improbable answers, indefinite answers, or answers which
in relation to others are so absurd, deceptive and prevaricated
that they amount to no answer at all, as well as answers which
are patently frivolous (e.g., reciting nursery rhymes as answers)
or "plainly inconsistent, manifestly contradictory and conspicuously unbelievable." °7 For example, a witness who claims that
he cannot remember if he has been married more than a week
fits this description."'
Convenient amnesia is another means of evasive contempt. 9
One definition from the Court of Appeals states that "the false
and evasive profession of an inability to recall events or details
which were significant and therefore memorable is ...[a] crimi-

nal contempt" as is "[a] general denial followed by professions of
an inability to recall particular events which would have left an
impression ...had they occurred .. 1o

This type of evasion

brings to mind Sunday's "Meet the Press" or a Presidential news
conference.
SECTION 22: PERJURY AND CONTEMPT UNDER PENAL AND
JUDICIARY LAW

"Every falsehood is an evasion, and every evasion, of necessity, amounts to some degree of falsehood."'
Although false
swearing and a refusal to answer are defined by conceptually dif-

"6
People v. Ianniello, 325 N.E.2d 146, 148 (N.Y. 1975).
207 In re Finkel, 286 N.Y.S. at 761.
218See United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1913).
209 See O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding
that the "constant repetition of 'I can't remember' in respect to matters of which the
witness must in all likelihood have recollection" was grounds for contempt); Appel,
211 F. at 496 (likening failure to remember with a transparent sham); People v. Saperstein, 140 N.E.2d 252, 255-56 (N.Y. 1957) (finding defendant in contempt because
his vivid recollection of business details and transactions caught on a wiretap precluded him from professing lack of recollection as to recorded conversations in which
he was involved); In re Reardon, 104 N.Y.S.2d 414, 421 (App. Div. 1951) (holding
that the court was not required to believe defendant when he testified that he could
not remember due to intoxication).
210 People v. Arnette, 449 N.E.2d 711, 712 (N.Y.
1983); see also People v.
Gottfried, 459 N.E.2d 1281, 1282 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that repeated responses of "I
don't remember," and similar responses, combined with evasive answers, were sufficient to find the defendant in contempt).
211 People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 185 N.Y.S.2d
952, 956 (App. Div.), af'd,
160 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1959).
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ferent statutes,212 there is a degree of falsity which amounts to a
refusal to answer. Similarly, there are, at least conceptually,
evasive answers which are also perjurious. When a criminal indictment charges both contempt and perjury for the same answer or answers, a properly charged jury may convict on both
counts 213 and the testimony complained of will determine
whether the verdict is contempt and/or perjury. Under the Judiciary Law, a witness who gives a contemptuously incredible
explanation is subject to prosecution for perjury or contempt, but
not summary contempt. 214 However, answers which are "so false

as to offer not the slightest probability of truthfulness" may have
the summary sanction "applied on the ground that although the
witness has uttered words he, in fact, has given no answers."2 5
It is the court that determines whether any issue of credibility
has been raised with respect to the answers provided and, if so,
the Judiciary Law summary contempt power may not be used.216
create an isThe court must "determine whether the answers ...

sue of credibility or whether they are so false and preposterous
as to preclude the raising of any issue of fact." 217 The problem

faced by courts, however, is distinguishing between a false answer and an answer that is so evasive that it amounts to no answer at all. 2" As difficult as it may seem, the Court of Appeals
has done exactly that.1 9
212

In New York, false swearing (perjury) is covered under N.Y. PENL Lw

Sections 210.00-50 (McKinney 1988) and refusal to answer (contempt) is covered by
N.Y. PENL LW sections 215.50-51.
213 See Finkel v. McCook, 286 N.Y.S. 755 (App. Div.), aff'd, 3 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y.
1936)).

214 See Valenti, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 961 (citing decisions which determined that
summary contempt was not a proper sanction).
215 Id. (citing Finkel, 286 N.Y.S. 755).
216See id. at 962-63 (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) and Ex

parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919)).
217 Id. at 963.
218 See People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 160 N.E.2d 647, 651 (N.Y. 1959)
(considering cases which distinguished clearly untruthful statements from those
that were so contradictory that they were as "useless as a complete refusal to answer") (citing Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 382 (1919); People v. De Feo, 131
N.Y.S.2d 806, 809-10 (App. Div. 1954)).
219 See Ruskin v. Detken, 298 N.E.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. 1973) ("[Tlhe only proper
test is whether on its mere face, and without inquiry collaterally, the testimony is
not a bona fide effort to answer the questions at all.") (quoting United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)). In doing so, the court avoided the nebulous
standards that were previously used, such as: " 'palpably false and evasive of the
obligation to answer', 'so false as to offer not the slightest probability of truthful-
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SECTION 23: LEGAL AND PROPER QUESTIONS

The imposition of a criminal contempt in New York for refusing to answer is dependent upon the legality of the interrogatories. 220 An interrogatory which does not violate a witness's le-

gal rights and is pertinent to the purpose of the proceeding is a
legal interrogatory, and is required or permitted by law2' A
question seeking to compel an answer which would violate a witness's rights is not a legal one.' A complex example of an improper interrogatory is one where a question's source is traceable
to official illegal conduct which directly violates a witness's
rights..2 ' However, this is not an absolute. An interrogatory
which does not violate a witness's legal rights does not extend
traditional exclusionary rules such that constitutional "askability" means legality. 24 A proper question is one that is fit,
suitable or appropriate, and depends on the issues involved or
likely to become involved in a proceeding.'
By definition,
whether an interrogatory is legal and proper is a question of
law. 221 "[Tihe statutory use of the word 'legal' [in the conjunctive
ness', 'so false and preposterous as to preclude the raising of any issue of fact', and
'so patently obstructive and evasive as to raise no issue of fact.' " Valenti, 160
N.E.2d at 654 (discussing standards previously used by the Appellate Division); see
also Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919) (citing, with approval, the Appel
standard relied upon in Detken).
220 See N.Y. PENL LW §§ 215.50(4), 215.51 (McKinney 1997)
(criminalizing the
refusal to answer a "legal and proper interrogatory").
221 See In re Barnes, 97 N.E. 508, 513 (N.Y. 1912) (Werner, J., concurring).
222 See id.
2 See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 49-61 (1972) (stating
that a grand
jury witness should not have been found guilty of contempt for the refusal to disclose information barred from evidence because of the government's illegal wiretap);
People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that contempt power
may not be used to compel a witness to answer a grand jury's questions based on
information obtained from an illegal wiretap); People v. Einhorn, 324 N.E.2d 551,
552 (N.Y. 1974) (per curiam) (noting that the defendant's "claim of illegal wiretapping, if sustained, constitutes a defense" to contempt).
224See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1974) (finding that a
witness may not refuse to answer questions posed by a grand jury regarding illegally obtained evidence because the exclusionary rule's objective is to deter police
misconduct, and extending the rule to insulate a witness from grand jury investigation would not further this objective).
225 See Barnes, 97 N.E. at 513 (Werner, J., concurring) (defining
a "pertinent"
question as one that is "relevant and material ...
to the purpose of the proceeding or
investigation").
226See id. (stating that a challenge to the pertinence of an inquiry "presents
a
question of law for the courts to decide"); People v. Ianniello, 325 N.E.2d 146, 149
(N.Y. 1975) (stating that the reliance by courts on perjury analysis is misplaced and
deciding that the propriety of questions asked of a witness is clearly for the court to
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with the word "proper"] makes particularly incongruous and selfcontradictory a treatment of the standard as one of fact." 27 Once
a court determines that a question is legal and proper, it must
charge the jury as it would on "any other question of law.""8 It is
unnecessary that the definitions of these crimes expressly state
what constitutes a legal and proper interrogatory, just as it is
inappropriate for witnesses to make such a determination for
themselves. Trial court screening and post conviction review of a
question's legality and propriety is sufficient protection for the
229
contemnor.
SECTION 24: MATERIALITY (RELEVANCY)
Unlike legality and propriety (see Section 23, supra), materiality, which is often used interchangeably with relevancy, is a
question of fact." ° To be material, evidence must have "a natural
tendency to influence or [be] capable of influencing" the outcome
of a legal proceeding. " It "need not prove directly the fact in issue. " 12 Materiality exists even when evidence circumstantially
supports a witness's credibility with respect to a fact in issue, or
a matter under consideration."3 Stated another way, evidence is
material if it has a natural effect or "tendency to impede or ...
dissuade."24 Evidence is also said to be material if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
...
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 5
SECTION 25: ORDERING A CRIMINAL TRIAL WITNESS TO TESTIFY
The possibility always exists that a witness in a criminal
decide).

227 id.

Id. at 150.
See People v. Cianciola, 383 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (denying motion to dismiss and rejecting the defendant's due process claims).
2'0See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 518-19 (1995) (discussing the historical division of authority on the subject and holding that materiality, as an element of contempt, must be decided by the fact-finder); People v. Davis, 423 N.E.2d
341, 345 (N.Y. 1981).
23' Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770
(1988)).
2'2Davis, 423 N.E.2d at 345.
233See
2U Id.

id.

235New

Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345 (1985) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401).
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trial may refuse to testify on Fifth Amendment or evidentiary
privilege grounds. If a trial judge overrules an assertion of an

evidentiary privilege, only the potential protection of the Fifth
Amendment remains. To compel a witness to testify, the prose-

cution must request that the court confer immunity on the witness. This request, and only this request, renders the court
competent authority to confer immunity. 6 The court may then
order the witness to answer the questions and advise the witness

that, upon answering truthfully and responsively, he will receive
immunity. The court should briefly advise the witness as to
what immunity means and warn him against peijury and con-

tempt. Should the witness subsequently refuse to testify in the
immediate view and presence of the court after being accorded

an opportunity to speak on his own behalf by way of defense,
explanation, or mitigation, he may summarily be held in contempt. 7 Conversely, in a civil trial, no party has authority to
confer immunity on a witness and cannot compel him to testify. 8 However, the court may impose serious adverse consequences, other than incarceration, upon one who asserts the
Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding2 9 The ultimate question
'36 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442, 444 (1972) (stating that the
most important exemption from a witness's testimonial duty is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); see also N.Y. CI . PO . LW § 50.10
(McKinney 1992).
237 See N.Y. CI
. Poc. Lw §§ 50.10, 50.20, 50.30 (McKinney 1992); see also
Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441; Ziccarelli v. New Jersey, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comn'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); People v. Rappaport, 391 N.E.2d 1284 (N.Y.
1979); ONeil v. Kasler, 385 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div. 1976); People v. Clinton, 346
N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1973).
'-s See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 472-76 (1975) (White, J., concurring).
See generally In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 784 (N.Y. 1917) (affirming order of disbarment and discussing immunity as a protection from criminal rather than civil sanctions).
"9 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976) (upholding prison disciplinary measure requiring inmates to serve 30 days in punitive confinement);
United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 42-46 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege and affirming court-ordered forfeiture of real
property); Brinks, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 707-10 (2d Cir. 1983)
(stating that "there is generally no constitutional interest underlying a particular
claim of privilege" in a civil matter, and allowing an employee's claim of privilege to
be used as evidence of the employer's negligence in determining punitive damages);
Kuriansky v. Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 525 N.Y.S.2d 225, 235-37 (App. Div.
1988) (rejecting defendant's claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, and affirming an
order compelling the defendants to disclose financial information regarding forfeiture of property gleaned from possible acts of Medicaid fraud); Commissioner of Soc.
Servs. ex rel. Jason C. v. Eliminia E., 521 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285-86 (App. Div. 1987)
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for contempt purposes is whether the witness's answers or his
production of evidence will incriminate him:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because
he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his
say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It
is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if "it clearly appears to the court that he is
mistaken." However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim,
were to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled
to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed
to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it
is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim "must be governed as much by his personal
perception of the
4° peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually
in evidence."M
New York has long adhered to this formulation."4
The
privilege against self-incrimination presupposes a real and substantial danger of incrimination.2 42
SECTION 26: ORDERING A GRAND JURY WITNESS To TESTIFY
A witness who testifies before a New York grand jury may
(finding that the Family Court could properly deny adjournment of civil child protective proceeding despite the mother's assertions that her rights against selfincrimination would be jeopardized in light of criminal charges pending against her
for child
abuse).
240Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) (citations omitted).
211 See People v. Priori, 58 N.E. 668, 670 (N.Y. 1900) (noting that the witness's
invocation of privilege was properly subjected to the review and discretion of the
trial court).
242 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951) (finding that by not
answering all grand jury questions regarding his Communist Party activities, the
petitioner effected a waiver of the privilege, and could not invoke it to avoid further
incrimination); see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406
U.S. 472, 478 (1972) (acknowledging the appellant's exposure to foreign prosecution,
but deciding that the use immunity offered to the appellant was sufficient; thus the
appellant was compelled to testify before a state commission investigating racketeering activities); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917) (determining
that a judge""'is ... bound to insist on a witness answering unless he is satisfied that

the answer will tend to place the witness in peril'" and "not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character' ") (quoting Queen v. Boyes, 121 E.R. 730, 730
(Q.B. 1861)).
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receive immunity from criminal prosecution and punishment.2 3
Therefore, absent other legally cognizable objection, the witness
must answer truthfully and responsively. If the witness raises
an objection or a claim of legal privilege, the prosecutor must obtain a court order commanding the witness to testify before administering the sanctions available for contempt under the Judiciary and Penal Laws.' If the witness flatly refuses to answer
without claim of legal privilege or objection, or avoids answering
by evading the question, the prosecutor can proceed under the
Judiciary Law with a view towards having the court hold the
witness in criminal contempt. This would be accomplished by
placing the witness before the court and having the court order
the witness to testify. If the witness remains recalcitrant, he or
she may be held in criminal contempt for disobeying the court's
order, or may be indicted for criminal contempt in the first degree.245 In order to assert a testimonial (only) privilege, a grand
jury witness must continuously assert the privilege until the
court either upholds the privilege or orders the witness to answer. By forcing the prosecutor to take the matter into open
court, the "proceeding is expedited and the danger of stalling
tactics [is] reduced."" 6 In addition to the risk of an indictment
for criminal contempt in the first degree, without the prosecution's prior recourse to the Judiciary Law, refusal or evasion by a
witness also waives all privileges or objections he might have
raised. 7 Unvarnished refusal to answer a question in a grand
jury proceeding--on nonverbalized grounds-is simply a refusal
to answer.2" In such a situation, there is no legal requirement
243

See Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 242 (1966) (stating that New York grants

immunity only when the immunity statute is strictly complied with); see also People
v. Laino, 176 N.E.2d 571, 579 (N.Y. 1961); Doyle v. Hofstader, 177 N.E. 489, 493-97
(N.Y. 1931).
2 See In re Halleran, 31 N.Y.S.2d 710, 715 (Queens County Ct. 1941) (finding
that a witness fully complied with a subpoena by appearing and testifying on dates
specified and that neither the jury foreman nor the district attorney could impose
sanctions for failure to testify beyond the express terms of the subpoena).
245 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750(A)(3), (4) (McKinney 1992); N.Y.
PENAL LAW
§ 215.51 (McKinney 1988).
246 People v. lanniello, 235 N.E.2d 439, 444 (N.Y. 1968).
247 See People v. Tantleff, 356 N.E.2d 477, 477 (N.Y. 1976); People v. DeSalvo,
295 N.E.2d 750, 753 (N.Y. 1973); People v. Gentile, 367 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (App. Div.
1975), affd, 350 N.E.2d 615 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Breindel, 356 N.Y.S.2d 626, 627
(App. Div.), affd mem., 324 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1974).
248See People v. Schenkman, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (N.Y. 1978);
People v.
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Ianniello, 325 N.E.2d 146, 148
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that the witness receive the court's direction to answer prior to
indictment. If,on the other hand, the witness refuses to answer
and claims a legal privilege or objection, then only after those assertions are overruled by the court must the witness answer or
face punishment for contempt under the Penal Law or Judiciary
Law. Under these circumstances, however, the witness will have
protected his or her rights to further review via pretrial motion
to dismiss or reversal on appeal. 9
SECTION 27: PERJURY AS CONTEMPT

"It would be a strained construction" 0 of a contempt statute
to fail to distinguish perjury from a refusal to testify. "Generally
251
speaking, false swearing does not constitute civil contempt."
But when it plainly appears that a denial of knowledge or recollection of facts which are well within the witness's knowledge
and recollection is a transparent ruse to evade answering questions, "the court may refuse to aid in a mere subterfuge and may
compel an answer.", 2 This power may not be used to punish
perjury or to compel answers which conform to expectation. 3
However a finding of pejury does not absolutely preclude a
sanction for contempt. Such a perverse immunity has no support in reason or law. Where there has been a formal answer,
but it is apparent that the truth is being withheld for the purpose of obstructing a proceeding from moving forward, punishment for contempt, as well as perjury, may be imposed.'
It is
(N.Y. 1975); People v. Lombardozzi, 423 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (App. Div. 1979); People
v. McGrath, 380 N.Y.S.2d 976, 985 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
See, e.g., Keenan v. Gigante, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing a
priest's refusal to answer a grand jury's questions based the priest-penitent privilege and his First Amendment rights); People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549 (N.Y.
1978) (finding that after grant of immunity, witnesses before a grand jury must testify truthfully); Santangelo v. People, 344 N.E.2d 404, 406 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that
the refusal to answer improper questions implicated appellate review); People v.
Einhorn, 324 N.E.2d 551, 552 (N.Y. 1974) (per curiam) (attesting to the discretion of
the court to review whether grand jury questioning was based upon illegally obtained evidence); In re Second Additional Grand Jury (Cioffi), 168 N.E.2d 663, 66465 (N.Y. 1960) (determining that the defendant's failure to answer despite an offer
of immunity was dispositive of the defendant's guilt for contempt).
2" Foster v. Hastings, 189 N.E. 229, 230 (N.Y. 1934).
251 Id. at 230.
212 Id. at 231.
149

2

See id.

See O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1930) (recognizing
that the appellant's conduct was "clearly obstructive and contemptuous of judicial
authority").
2"
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well settled that in order to punish perjury as a contempt in the
immediate view and presence of the court, obstruction of the
court, proceedings must be shown in addition to the elements of
perjury under the general law." There is a distinction between
the untruthful statement which does not clearly appear to be
such from the face of the record, and testimony which is so inconsistent or unbelievable as to make it apparent from the record itself that the witness has deliberately concealed the truth
and has given answers in form only. The fact that a witness
gives some response to a legal and pertinent question is not dispositive of the issue of whether he has refused to answer.2 6
Simply put, perjury as a means of refusing to answer is not beyond the contempt power."
SECTION 28: TALESMAN CONTEMPT

"Concealment
or [deliberate]
misstatement by a
[prospective] juror upon a voir dire examination is punishable as
a contempt if its tendency [is] to obstruct the process of justice.""8 A juror is not punished for concealment per se or perjury. Rather, the contempt is based on the juror's obstruction of
the court's proceedings by making use of his concealment or false
statements to gain acceptance as a juror.29 The talesman is to
be distinguished from the witness. A talesman, when accepted
as a juror, becomes a part of the court since voir dire is part of
the process of organizing the court for purposes of trial.2" The
talesman who lies or conceals his way onto a jury is a "juror in
name only."26 ' Contempt proceedings are not instituted against
him because of his vote in the jury room. It has been theorized
that the talesman's obstruction of the proceedings by lying and
concealing, at a minimum, deprives one or both sides of an opportunity at trial to challenge the juror for cause, "thus denying
See Exparte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919).
2$See Finkel v. McCook, 286 N.Y.S. 755, 760 (App. Div.), affd, 3 N.E.2d 460
(N.Y. 1936).
-7 See id. In order for perjury to amount to an act of
contempt, there must be a
further element of obstruction. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1945); Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933); United States v. McGovern, 60 F.2d 880, 889
(2d Cir. 1932).
258Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 10 (1933).
m See id. at 11.
2'

260

See id.

261 Id.
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both the right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury.

262

SECTION 29: FALSE PLEADING AND CONTEMPT

A false pleading has been held not to be a contempt of
court. 2' A pleading is not "a proceeding of the court,"2 and,
therefore, is not a court mandate. 26' Rather, it is the proceeding
of a party in court, and thus a false pleading is not a deceit upon
the court.2"6 The courts receive pleadings as part of the litigation
a verified pleading, a court's reprocess. If peijury occurs in
267
law.
criminal
the
to
is
course
SECTION 30: CONTEMPT, BAIL AND ABSCONDING DEFENDANTS

The reasons why early English courts proceeded against ab212 See In re Mossie, 589 F. Supp. 1397, 1410 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 768 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1985).
26 See Wolff v. Hubbard, 78 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1948);
Gernhardt v. Boland, 211 N.Y.S. 877, 879 (Yonkers City Ct. 1925). But see Moffat v.
Herman, 22 N.E. 287, 287 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a false pleading may amount to
civil contempt and declining to decide whether it constitutes criminal contempt).
26 Fromme v. Gray, 43 N.E. 215, 216 (N.Y. 1896). But see Martin Cantine Co. v.
Warshauer, 28 N.Y.S. 139, 139-40 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (holding that a false answer is a
"proceeding of the court").
2' See Fromme, 43 N.E. at 216.
2' See id. ("lit is absurd to say that a false answer ... deceives the court. The

court is not misled by it, nor regards it otherwise than as a defense ....").
'6 See id.; see also Wolff, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (explaining that the alternative
would be a possible "parallel civil contempt proceeding" in every case of perjury
punishable under criminal statutes); Gernhardt,211 N.Y.S. at 880 (holding that the
petitioner's false pleading did not constitute civil contempt and left the question of
pejury for criminal court). In federal proceedings, note that in 1994, 18 U.S.C. §
1001 provided that,
[wihoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes or uses any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). This section was construed to include false statements
made in the judicial branch. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509
(1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995). Hubbard was
then superseded by a 1996 amendment to section 1001 which limited the application
of section 1001 in the judicial branch. See United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1997). Currently, section 1001 does not apply to "a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel." 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1996).
In New York, the C.P.L.R. requires that many pleadings be verified by affidavit
of the party. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3020 (McKinney 1991). But see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3020
cmt. C3020:1 (McKinney 1991) (questioning the effectiveness of verification when
district attorneys will not prosecute for a peijury in a civil pleading).
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sconding defendants through outlawry-by proclamation summoning the absconder to five successive terms of court and then
forfeiting his property-are not clear.26 It is clear, however, that
English courts had the power to treat failure to appear pursuant
to their orders as contempts.6 9
27°
Outlawry was never known to the American federal law.
Issuing a bench warrant and forfeiting bail following flight are
not necessarily effective deterrents to other defendants.271 There

is no substantial justification to allow an absconding defendant
to risk only monetary forfeiture, recapture and indictment for
bail jumping when he intentionally disobeys a direct court order
to appear in court.272 It appears, however, that punishment by
the court for a criminal contempt of its bail order would bar
criminal prosecution for the crime of bail jumping.273
SECTION 31: CONTEMPT AND BIAS RECUSAL MOTIONS

"The right to be heard" embodies the "right to file [relevant]
motions and pleadings essential to present claims and raise relevant issues."274 Since a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a
basic ingredient of the right to be heard under due process of
law, it thus follows that motions to escape a biased judge raise
2 5
constitutional issuesY.
Allegations in a motion for a judge to recuse himself on the ground of bias must, of their very nature, be
insulting.276 Asserting in a good faith recusal motion, in a reSee Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 170 (1958) (proposing that English
courts considered absconding to be such a serious crime to justify imposing outlaw
status rather than contempt), overruled in part by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968) (overruling Green to the extent it held courts may punish any criminal contempt without a jury trial).
0 See Green, 356 U.S. at 170-71
270See id. (citing United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1952)); see
also Bruce A. Green, "Hareand Hounds': The Fugitive Defendant's Constitutional
Right to be Pursued,56 BRoOK. L. REV. 439, 453 (1990) (discussing the development
of American jurisprudence regarding fugitive defendants).
271See Green, 356 U.S. at 173 ("[Ihe issuance of a bench warrant and the forfeiture of bail following flight have generally proved inadequate to dissuade defendants from defying court orders.").
272 See id.
273 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 694-97 (1993) (holding that the test
for double jeopardy established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),
bars subsequent prosecution if neither offense contains an element not contained in
the other).
274 Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965).
218

276

See id.

27r

See id. at 137 ("But if the charges [of bias] were 'insulting' it was inherent in
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spectful, firm, but civil manner, that a court is biased, is not a
contempt committed within or without the immediate view and
presence of the court. 277 This does not mean that a bias motion
or allegation is a license to beat a presiding judge around the
ears in open court-especially with a jury or the public presentsuch that his ability and authority to preside will be obstructed
or impaired. 278 Depending on degree and circumstance, a law-

yer's deliberately false accusation of bias may be the subject of
disciplinary action and possible contempt proceedings.2

79

But

the issue of bias raised .... "); In re Rotwein, 51 N.E.2d 669, 672 (N.Y. 1943)
("Doubtless a judge conscious of his rectitude and convinced of his judicial fairness
would deeply resent such statements of counsel ....").
277 See Rotwein, 51 N.E.2d at 673. Contempts committed
in open court are
treated differently from contempts committed outside the presence of the court.
Courts may immediately punish individuals who commit acts of contempt in open
court without further proof or trial. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 314 (1888)
("[I]t is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England and of this country
... that for direct contempts committed in the face of the court ... the offender may,
in its discretion, be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without
trial ... and without other proof .... "); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534
(1925) ("To preserve order in the court room ... the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when
occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence ... before punishment, because
the court has seen the offense."). On the other hand, individuals who commit contempts not within the immediate view of the court are entitled to notice and fair
hearing. See id. at 537 ("Due process of law ... in the prosecution of contempt, except
of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the
charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation.").
278 See Mangiatordi v. Hyman, 483 N.Y.S.2d 82,
82-83 (App. Div. 1984)
(confirming finding of contempt where petitioner's conduct and statements suggesting bias by the court were disruptive and abusive toward the judge during trial); cf.
Breitbart v. Galligan, 525 N.Y.S.2d 219 (App. Div. 1988) (holding summary contempt adjudication was improper where defense counsel asserted in open court but
outside the hearing of the jury that the judge was improperly holding ex parte conferences which he prosecutor).
279 See Werlin v. Goldberg, 517 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (App. Div. 1987) (finding defense counsel guilty of criminal contempt for challenging repeatedly in open court
the trial judge's ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial). For example, in In re
Mordkofsky, 649 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1996), according to the Referee's report,
Mordkofsky, an attorney, questioned a judge's ruling and accused the judge of not
considering all relevant documentation. The judge held the attorney in contempt
and noted for the record that the attorney had threatened him at a sidebar. The attorney had, in another proceeding, filed a motion stating that the judge had fixed
the case, and subsequently accused the judge of being a crook. Mordkofsky was suspended from the practice of law for six months. The court noted the Referee's conclusion that the respondent "'casts aside ethical considerations in the name of zealous representation' and 'is a serious danger to both courts and litigants alike'" and"
'Ibly a combination of irresponsibility, malice and unadulterated speculation ...
[Mordkofsky] ... sees wrongdoing by judges and lawyers alike where there is none,
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what is really a contempt
proceeding may not be paraded as a
2 80
disciplinary proceeding.
SECTION 32: NOTICE OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
"The exact form of the procedure in the prosecution of ...
contempts is not important" so long as there is notice and an opportunity to be heard.2 1 "An application to punish for a con-

tempt punishable civilly may be commenced by notice of motion
... or by an order ... to show cause .... "2 It must contain an
eight-point bold type warning concerning arrest and imprisonment 2' which is waivable if the lack thereof is not asserted in a
timely manner, or if the contemnor contests on the merits.2 4
Judiciary Law section 761 states that "[an application to
punish for contempt in a civil contempt proceeding shall be
served upon the accused, unless service upon the attorney for the
accused be ordered by the court or judge.""
The question of

when an attorney continues to represent a civil contemnor has
been the subject of case law. Service of an order to show cause or
motion may be made upon the attorney who currently represents
the contemnor in an action which is still pending."5 "Attorney,"
and manufactures accusations with total recklessness.' "Id. at 73.
280 See In re Jafree, 741 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding district court Executive Committee had no authority to try contempt proceeding). In Jafree, the
court held that appellee's conduct constituted contempt and that the exclusive remedy was a contempt proceeding prescribed by statute. Thus the court held that the
district court Executive Committee had no authority to try the contempt in a disciplinary proceeding and subsequently vacated the Committee's order holding the appellant in contempt. See id. at 136, 138.
281 Cooke, 267 U.S. at 536.
282 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 756 (McKinney 1992). Thus, the New York State Legislature
has taken the view that one can commence a contempt proceeding by notice of motion without prejudice. See Nelson v. Nationwide Measuring Serv., Inc., 398
N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (App. Div. 1977).
283 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 756 (McKinney 1992).
214 See In re Rappaport, 444 N.E.2d 1330, 1330 (N.Y. 1982).
28' N.Y. JUD. LAW § 761 (McKinney 1992).
288 See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 193 N.Y.S. 702, 703 (App. Div. 1922) (citing
Welch v. Welch, 110 N.Y.S. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1908) and Carr v. Carr, 118 N.Y.S. 625
(Sup. Ct. 1909)); see also Circharo v. Circharo, 51 N.Y.S.2d 15, 15 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
(holding that service of an order to show cause on defendant's attorney was sufficient where defendant failed to pay alimony as ordered). But where final judgment
has been entered, service made upon the attorney who represented the contemnor
in the action is not sufficient to acquire jurisdiction. See Keller v. Keller, 91 N.Y.S.
528, 532 (App. Div.), affd, 93 N.Y.S. 1136 (App. Div. 1905); see also Wulff v. Wulff,
133 N.Y.S. 807, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1911), affd, 135 N.Y.S. 289 (App. Div. 1912) (finding
service of order to show cause could not be made on the contenmor's attorney where
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as stated in the New York Judiciary Law, has been interpreted
to refer to the "attorney of record for the 'accused,' not his counsel or any other attorney who has not formally appeared for him
in the action."287 An attorney's appearance on appeal is not a
general appearance for the purpose of legally effective service of
an order to show cause in a civil contempt proceeding.28 An attorney's representation for purposes of service generally terminates with the judgment, but this proposition has many qualifications. 9 The authority of the attorney as agent for service in
an action continues with the presumed assent of the client until
the client takes some affirmative step indicating otherwise, or
some other legal event intervenes.29 Where a civil contempt involves a nonparty witness, the order to show cause must be
served personally upon that witness.291
Judiciary Law section 751(1) provides that when a person
has committed a criminal contempt outside the immediate view
and presence of the court "the party charged must be notified of
292
the accusation, and have a reasonable time to make a defense."
No mention is made of an order to show cause or a written motion.293 Criminal contempts, by express statutory language, are
not punished in the same way as civil contempts.294 Without exfinal judgment was entered and thus contempt proceedings could not be instituted).
27 Patillo v. Patillo, 178 N.Y.S.2d 154, 159 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
288 See Vingut v. Sire, 148 N.Y.S. 533, 534 (App. Div. 1914) (holding that the defendant was not in contempt of court for failing to appear when the order to show
cause was served upon the attorney who only signed the defendant's notice of appeal).
289 See Commercial Bank v. Foltz, 43 N.Y.S. 985, 987 (App. Div.
1897) (stating
"the authority of the attorney terminates with the judgment ...
but ...this statement ... needs many qualifications").
290

See id. at 988.

291

See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 761 (McKinney 1992); Long Island Trust Co. v. Rosen-

berg, 442 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566 (App. Div. 1981). A nonparty contemnor is in essence
viewed as a new party to the proceeding, and is therefore "entitled to the same level
of notice required to institute any special proceeding against any new party." Id. at
567; see, e.g., John Sexton & Co. v. Law Foods, Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (App.
Div. 1985) (finding no jurisdiction over a nonparty in an underlying action where
motion of contempt was not personally served); Hampton v. Annal Management Co.,
646 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Term 1996) (holding mail service to corporation's employee ineffective to confer jurisdiction over the nonparty corporation for contempt
judgment).
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 751(1).
In the federal courts, notice of the accusation may be given orally in open
court by the judge in the presence of the alleged contemnor, or by an order to show
cause, or an order of arrest. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
' Compare N.Y. JUD. LAW § 751 (describing the punishment for criminal con-
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planation, however, the case law has required that a party
charged with "a violation of an order or [a] mandate as a basis
for criminal contempt" be served personally with an order to

show cause why the alleged contemnor should not be so held,295
reasoning that such requirements are jurisdictional and thus
unwaivable."' Case law has further provided that "[iut is well es-

tablished that a criminal contempt mandate can only be rendered in a special proceeding, which requires personal service
with equal dignity to that required of a summons." 7 In addition, "[f]ailure to personally serve the alleged contemnor is a jurisdictional defect requiring reversal."2 ' These cases do not indicate the basis of their jurisdictionally exacting pronouncements
but appear to rely less than completely on Billingsly v. Better
Business Bureau of N.Y. City,299 which was an earlier case where
the criminal contemnor "was not served with the order to show
cause and affidavits and did not voluntarily appear." '00 In
Billingsly, the court stated,
it is seen that, while plaintiffs conduct in part could have been
construed as a violation of the order directing him to answer
tempt), with N.Y. JUD. LAW § 754 (describing the proceeding to punish for civil con-

temt).
People v. Balt, 312 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (App. Div. 1970); see Pitt v. Davison, 37
N.Y. 235, 238-39 (1867) (establishing personal service for punishing criminal contempt); see also In re Minter, 518 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that
there was no personal service in a criminal contempt proceeding where order to
show cause was sent by regular mail); In re Murray, 469 N.Y.S.2d 747, 751 (App.
Div. 1983) (finding service inadequate where the order to show cause for criminal
contempt proceedings were left at court and picked up by a member of alleged contemnor's staff). Such requirement is based on" 'the well settled principle of the
common law, that no person shall be condemned unheard.'" Billingsley v. Better
Bus. Bureau of N.Y. City, Inc., 249 N.Y.S. 584, 585 (App. Div. 1931) (quoting Pitt, 37
N.Y. at 238).
See Balt, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 589-90; see also Howard T.P. v. Maria B., 654
N.Y.S.2d 419, 419 (App. Div. 1997) (finding that the lack of personal service of an
order to show cause was a jurisdictional defect); Lu v. Betancourt, 496 N.Y.S.2d 754,
756 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that an appearance in response to an order to show
cause and contesting it on the merits does not amount to a waiver in a criminal contempt proceeding).
7 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Morano's of Fifth Avenue, Inc.),
533 N.Y.S.2d 869, 872 (App. Div. 1988) See Murray, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 751 ("A proceeding to punish for a criminal contempt of court which arises out of a civil action
is aspecial proceeding separate and distinct from the original underlying action.").
Morano's of Fifth Ave., Inc., 533 N.Y.S.2d at 872; see, e.g., Lu, 496 N.Y.S.2d at
756 (vacating contemnor's conviction and commitment for criminal contempt for improper service).
249 N.Y.S. 584 (App. Div. 1931).
3' Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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certain questions at an examination before trial and to that extent could have been punished, as a civil contempt, in fact,
without due notice, plaintiff was condemned for acts other than
mere disobedience to an order in the action. He was punished
for deliberate and insulting comtumacity. Such a judgment
cannot be rendered without personal service of process.30'
The opinion concluded by stating that:
[niothing in this opinion is to be taken as a holding that the
mere disobedience of an order may not also be a criminal contempt as well as a civil one. But, to the extent that any violation of any mandate of the court is to be punished as a criminal
contempt, it must be on notice.302
The opinion does not expressly indicate whether "notice" was
meant to be synonymous with a personally served order to show
cause, but it impliedly treats the terms as such.3 Yet today's
view, without analysis, is that
[tihe rule oft stated in [New York] is that service of the order to
show cause to commence a criminal contempt proceeding must
be personally served on the accused. This'rule exists despite the
statutory requirement as to service. Judiciary Law § 751(1)
provides merely that "the party charged must be notified "of
the
34
accusation, and have a reasonable time to make a defense. 0
A later case, Departmentof Housing Preservationand Development v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc.,"°5 qualifies this statement:
[T]here is no appellate case expressly holding that personal delivery of the order to show cause is the only permissible means
of commencing a criminal contempt proceeding, or holding that
statutory alternatives to in-hand delivery are jurisdictionally
infirm. Many of the cases in which service has not been upheld
involved situations where service was made only upon the con30 8
temnor's attorney or others unconnected with the contemnor.
The court also stated, "it is frequently the case that those
who have flagrantly violated the court's orders are not disposed
301Id. at

585-86 (emphasis added).
Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
303 See id. at 568 (stating that criminal contempt judgment must be preceded by
personal service of process).
" Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. v. Arick, 503 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (Civ.
Ct. 1986), rev'd sub nom. on othergrounds Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. v.
Chaney, 526 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Term 1988).
30 524 N.Y.S.2d 324 (App. Term 1987).
2a Id. at 326. (citations omitted).
2
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to make themselves readily available for personal delivery of notice""7 Here follows some history which may serve as some explanation, or, at least an historical frame of reference.
In 1867, the New York Court of Appeals opined that
[i]f we keep in mind the distinction between proceedings to
punish criminal contempts, and proceedings as for contempts to
enforce civil remedies, we shall see the reason why personal notification of the accusation is ...
indispensable in the one case,

while it may not be in the other. Where the proceeding is to enforce a civil remedy, the party in default has already had the
opportunity of contesting his liability to perform what the proceeding seeks to compel him to perform, and such proceeding is,
in effect, but an execution of the judgment or order against
30

hiM

8

This holding was later brought into the Code of Civil Procedure and today is Judiciary Law section 761.309
A later opinion from the same court, involving subpoena
service and contempt for disobedience thereof, declared that
[iut is assumed without color of reason or authority that a witness, not a party, may appear by attorney and that any order
subsequently served on the attorney in contempt proceedings to
punish the witness for not appearing, may be served on the attorney, and this service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to
punish the witness for contempt. It is perfectly safe to say that
no principle or authority can be found to support such a proposition, and yet it is one of the fundamental assumptions in this
case, since it is based upon the notion that a subpoena or an order to testify may be served, not upon the witness, but on some
one [sic] claiming to represent him, and then in case there is no
appearance the witness can be punished for contempt.310
The Revised Statutes, which preceded the Code of Civil Procedure, required personal service for criminal contempt (section
12), but exempted civil contempt from such a requirement
307

Id. at 327.

Pitt v. Davison, 37 N.Y. 235, 238-39 (1867).
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 761 (McKinney 1992) (providing that in a civil contempt
proceeding, service can be on the accused, or on the attorney of the accused, if ordered by the court); see also Jeweler's Mercantile Agency Ltd. v. Rothschild, 49 N.E.
871, 872 (N.Y. 1898) (discussing the incorporation of the holding in Pitt into the
Code of Civil Procedure); Davidowitz v. Hamroff, 90 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39-40 (Sup. Ct.
1949) (tracing the development of the holding in Pitt to the Code of Civil Procedure,
and finally to section 761 of the Judiciary Law).
310In re Depue, 77 N.E. 798, 801 (N.Y. 1906).
308
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(Section 14) because the order to show cause was held to be "but
a notice of motion ...[which]... may ordinarily be served upon
31
the attorney of the adverse party.",
However, "[a] proceeding to
punish for criminal contempt arising out of a civil action is considered separate from that action and must3 12be commenced by
personal service upon the alleged contemnor."

33: SUFFICIENCY OF CONTEMPT ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
The courts in their discretion may adopt such modes of adjudicating contempts committed without their presence as they
deem proper, "provided due regard [is] had to the essential rules
that obtain in the trial of matters of contempt."3 13 The only requirements are notice and an opportunity for explanation and
defense. "[S]ufficiency of the notice depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case .
"The manner in which the proceeding shall be conducted, so that it be without oppression or
unfairness, is a matter of judicial regulation."315 At the least,
sufficient time must be given for an accused contemnor to weigh
the merits of the charge and evaluate possible defenses as well
as to gather evidence and secure an attorney.316 Sufficient time
is reasonable time. Put simply, the order to show cause, which
initiates a contempt proceeding, should competently state those
facts necessary to put the contemnor on notice as to what conduct constituted the contempt, and to allow him a reasonable
period of time to meet the charge with a counseled defense in
open court.318 If the contemnor appears and defends on the merits, such actions constitute a waiver of any defects in the preSECTION

3"Pitt, 37 N.Y. at 241.

Lu v. Betancourt, 496 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (App. Div. 1986).
Exparte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 278 (1889).
3" See City Sch. Dist. v. Federation of Teachers, 375 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 (App.
Div. 1975) (citing Spector v. Allen, 22 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1939)); see also Sassower v.
Sheriff of Westchester County, 824 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1987) (listing factors used
in determining whether due process has been satisfied).
3"'Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. at 279 (quoting Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 523, 540 (1868)); see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932)
(explaining that due process is satisfied by "suitable notice and adequate opportunity to be heard").
312
313

316
17

See In re Weeks, 570 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir. 1978).
See id. at 246-47.

318See In

re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948); O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d

201, 203 (2d Cir. 1930).
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liminary process. 1 9
SECTION 34: BURDENS OF PROOF FOR CONTEMPT

Criminal contempt under the Judiciary Law must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 ' No case found has ever explicated
why it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 One court
stated that criminal contempt of court under the Judiciary Law
is criminal in character and it was therefore "elementary" that
guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 32 This is an
example of jurisprudential oversimplification by the use of jargon. The issue is more complex because the criminal contempt
proceeding, while civil in nature, has vindication as its objective,
not remediation.3 m Since the same offense may be punished in
both civil and criminal contempt, a court may invoke criminal
contempt to achieve its desired objective.3 24
Civil contempt has been said to require reasonable certainty. 25 Then again, it has also been posited by the Court of

9 See In re Nunns, 176 N.Y.S. 858, 871 (App. Div. 1919).

See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798
(1987) (citing Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911));
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (same); County of Rockland v.
Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 464 N.E.2d 121, 123 (N.Y. 1984) (addressing criminal
contempt in the context of a labor injunction); Kuriansky v. Feldman, 533 N.Y.S.2d
679, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (stating the burden of proof for criminal contempt is guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt).
32' See N.A. Dev. Co. v. Jones, 472 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68 (App. Div. 1984)
(Sandier, J., dissenting) (discussing the different standards of proof for criminal and
civil contempt and asserting that a single standard-proof beyond a reasonable
doubt-be required whenever incarceration is contemplated).
322 See In re Shapolsky, 185 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (App.
Div. 1959).
3 See People v. Colombo, 271 N.E.2d 694, 696 (N.Y. 1971), vacated on other
grounds, 405 U.S. 9 (1972); see also Goodman v. State, 292 N.E.2d 665, 667 (N.Y.
1972) (" '[Tihese contempts in their origin and punishment partake of the nature of
crimes, which are violations of the public law, and end in the vindication of public
justice.'") (quoting People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 4 N.E. 259,
260 (N.Y. 1886)); Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc.,
218 N.E.2d 703, 704 (N.Y. 1966) (finding that although contempt involves a civil
proceeding, punishment is penal in nature). In civil contempt proceedings, incarceration is not viewed as a punishment, but rather as a tool to force the defendant to
comply. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. In contrast, criminal contempt is a punishment designed to protect the judicial system and involves vindication of an offense
against public justice. See McCormick v. Axelrod, 453 N.E.2d 508, 512, modified,
459 N.E.2d 1314 (N.Y. 1983).
324 See McCormick, 453 N.E.2d
at 512.
32 See id. at 513; N.A Dev. Co., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 366; Hynes v. Hartman, 406
N.Y.S.2d 818,819 (App. Div. 1978).
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Appeals that the burden of proof in civil contempt where willful
violations result in coercive incarceration is "clear and convincing evidence (an issue this court has yet to determine)."" 6
is to 'instruct the factThe function of a standard of proof ...
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a par[a] standard [which] serves to
ticular type of adjudication' ...

allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate
the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. 327
SECTION 35: THE MANDATE OF COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT
Judiciary Law contempt proceedings are stricti juris."
Failure to adhere to the statutory requirements vitiates the contempt.329 The order or mandate of commitment for punishment

of contempt must state with reasonable clarity the particular
facts and circumstances of the offense.33° "[F]ailure to comply
with this statutory requirement renders the commitment totally
defective."331 The mandate, however, need not state the particu-

lar statutes upon which the commitment is based. 32 No appellate review of a contempt adjudication and punishment is possible unless it has been reduced to writing.33 The particular facts
and circumstances of a contempt, which must be specified in the
_'' Powers v. Powers, 653 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1995). The presently constituted Court of Appeals has always been liberal with unpresented-question answering dicta when it suited its purpose. This makes one wonder why the bashfulness in
this case.
827Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
32 See Berkon v. Mahoney, 180 Misc. 659, 661 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, 49
N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1944), affd, 62 N.E.2d 388 (1945).
329 See Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N.Y. 368,
372 (1876).
-oSee In re Rotwein, 51 N.E.2d 669, 671 (N.Y. 1943); Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc. v. Pioneer Warehouse Corp., 402 N.Y.S.2d 5, 5 (App. Div. 1978); TriState Investors' Corp. v. Kitching, 246 N.Y.S. 240, 244 (App. Div. 1930), aff'd, 178
N.E. 800 (1931); Roncoroni v. Gross, 86 N.Y.S. 1113, 1114 (App. Div. 1904).
3' In re Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, P.C., 495 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (App. Div.
1985) (citing Douglas v. Adel, 199 N.E. 35, 37 (N.Y. 1935)).
3"2See

Berkon v. Mahoney, 49 N.Y.S.2d 551, 551 (App. Div. 1944), affd, 62

N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1945) (per curiam) (mem.).
See Solano v. Martin, 389 N.Y.S.2d 413, 413 (App. Div. 1976) (dismissing an
attorney's appeal regarding an act of contempt committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court where the contempt citation was not in writing); Lynch v.
Derounian, 341 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div. 1973) (stating that review of contempt
is predicated on a written order but determining that finding of contempt was
.unwarranted").
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mandate of commitment, must be more than mere conclusory
allegations.
In fact, the Judiciary Law contempt statutes
themselves are defined by the use of adjectives. 5 Hence their
use in a mandate of commitment to characterize specified acts
and their effect does not cause facts to "degenerate into ...
con-

clsion[s]."336 The recitals in a mandate of commitment for
criminal contempt differ from those in a final order (mandate) of
civil contempt.337 The mandate for criminal contempt must state
all the facts constituting the elements of the contempt, including
that the disobedience was willful.338 The mandate for civil contempt, while not requiring a showing of willfulness, must have
the additional phrase that the contempt "defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced"
a right of a party to an action or special
39
proceeding.
SECTION 36: REVIEW OF CONTEMPT ADJUDICATIONS

Appellate review of contempt adjudications is either by direct appeal or a C.P.L.R. Article 78 proceeding in the nature of
certiorari.34 ° When committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, a summary punishment for criminal contempt
is reviewable through an Article 78 proceeding, and on occasion
by writ of certiorari." Article 78 is almost exclusively the vehi'4See Waldman v. Churchill, 186 N.E. 690, 691-92 (N.Y. 1933) (affirming a
finding of criminal contempt where defendant's behavior was characterized as
"rash," "heedless," 'rude," and "offensive").
5 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750 (A)(1) (McKinney 1992) (listing disorderly, contemptuous and insolent behavior as punishable by the court of record).
Waldman, 186 N.E. at 692.
37 See Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Brick Layers' & Mason
Plasterers' Int'l
Union, 193 N.Y.S. 368, 369 (App. Div. 1922). A final order for criminal contempt
should include language that the contempt was "willful"; a final order in a civil contempt proceeding need not refer to the willfulness of the offender. See id. at 370.
8 Judiciary Law section 752 states the requisites for criminal contempts generally, whereas Judiciary Law section 755 specifically states punishment may be
summarily imposed when the offense is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 752, 755 (McKinney 1992).
'9 Id. §§ 754, 770; see also Oppenheimer v. Oscar Shoes, Inc., 488 N.Y.S.2d 693,
695 (App. Div. 1985); Eastern Concrete Steel Co., 193 N.Y.S. at 370.
3,oSee N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801(2) (McKinney 1994).
341See id.; see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 752 (McKinney 1992); Douglas v. Adel,
199
N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1935) (determining that acts within the immediate view of the
court are reviewable by an order of certiorari); People v. Sanders, 395 N.Y.S.2d 190,
191 (App. Div. 1977) (noting that while normal review of summary contempt is by
an Article 78 proceeding or order of certiorari, an adequate record existed for review
by direct appeal).
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cle for appellate review because it is the judge who, as witness to
the offense, exercises discretion and orders summary punishment based on his own observation and knowledge.342 The mandate of contempt creates the record for review, and the judge's
personal observation, and its effect on him, constitutes the formal proof.13 Here, the mandate of commitment is a crucial
starting point irrespective of all else that follows by way of record development. If the mandate of commitment fails to establish specific acts of contempt which occurred in the immediate
view and presence of the court, review is dependent on appeal
rather than certiorari.3 If an adequate stenographic record exists, appeal should also lie.3 45 As to criminal or civil contempts
committed outside the immediate view and presence of the court,
the proceeding is commenced by order to show cause or motion
and the adjudication of contempt takes place only after an adversary hearing,3 " thus creating a record for appeal.3

SECTION 37: PURGATION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS
An indictment for the crime of criminal contempt may not be
purged by doing or refraining from that which was commanded
or forbidden in the first place, and a purge order may be ineffec-

See Douglas, 199 N.E. at 37; Sanders, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
m See Douglas, 199 N.E. at 37; In re Barnes, 97 N.E. 508, 512 (N.Y. 1912)
(Werner, J., concurring); People ex rel. Clark v. Truesdell, 79 N.Y.S.2d 413, 416
(1948).
3"See Douglas, 199 N.E. at 37 (determining that acts within the immediate
view and presence of the court may be reviewed by an order of certiorari); In re
Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, P.C., 495 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (App. Div. 1985) (finding
mandate of commitment invalid for court's failure to specify particular in-court acts
necessary to support criminal contempt).
'45 See Douglas, 199 N.E. at 37 (stating that acts of contempt occurring outside
the presence of the court must be recorded and reviewed on appeal); see also People
v. Clinton, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345, 345-346 (App. Div. 1972) (holding review by appeal
appropriate where an adequate record exists); People v. Zweig, 300 N.Y.S.2d 651,
653-54 (App. Div. 1969) (finding that in-court acts of contempt may also be properly
appealable where the the record is adequate for appellate review).
346 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 756 (McKinney
1992).
47 See Barnes, 97 N.E. 508, 512 (1912) (alternative
holding) (Werner, J., concurring) (considering due process provisions regarding notice and hearing for acts of
contempt occurring outside the presence of the court, positing that proof "should be
held to embrace the evidence which the accused may furnish"); see also Silver v.
Hannah, 326 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (App. Div. 1971) (per curiam) (determining that appeal, rather than an article 78 proceeding, was proper where a finding of contempt
resulted from a formal hearing and full record for review).
312
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tual on the indictment.

8

More than one hundred years ago, in affirming a criminal
contempt, the Court of Appeals held that a contemnor could not
supplement the record on appeal by including an affidavit stating that the contemnor had, as of the time of the appeal, done
the act commanded. 9 The court stated, "[i]f this were so, and
the defendant had any claim, founded upon such action, to be absolved from the contempt, he should have applied for relief to the
court. He cannot have the benefit of such action upon an appeal
from the order punishing him for contempt." Rather, the disposal must be done before the court below."'
In today's era, the court has posited the following dictum:
Unnecessary to reach, and probably incorrect, is the conclusion
that under no circumstances may a "criminal" summary contempt be purged. In fact, this court has concluded, in some circumstances at least, that one summarily adjudged in criminal
contempt pursuant to section 750 of the Judiciary Law "holds
the key to his freedom." Arguably, implicit in such a conclusion
is the ability to purge some criminal contempts as distinguished
from crimes of contempt.35'
Some clarity, at least in logic, may be achieved if this dictum
is restated in positive terms: probably correct is the conclusion
that, under rare circumstances, a criminal contempt may be
purged.352 Beyond this conclusion, there exists no certainty. In
this regard, appellate division cases now fall into two categories.
First are those which state that, in essence, purgation is actually
only a stay or modification of the punishment and such a stay or
modification is strictly within the province of the court that
originally adjudged the contempt.353 Second are those which, for
3'8
See People v. Leone, 376 N.E.2d 1287, 1288 (N.Y. 1978) (per curiam) ("[Qince
a contempt goes to indictment and prosecution, forgiveness by an individual Judge
or court may not be permitted to frustrate the power to punish for the affront to
public justice.").
2'9 See People ex rel. Day v. Bergen, 53 N.Y. 404, 411 (1873).
so Id.
35'
Leone, 376 N.E. 1288-89 (citations omitted).
252 See id. at 1289.
3 See People v. Belge, 399 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 1977) (finding that the
defendant's subsequent oral statement did not warrant the reversal of a contempt
order and remanding the matter to the trial court); Typothetae of New York v. Typographical Union No. 6, 122 N.Y.S. 975, 977 (App. Div. 1910) (characterizing a
purge of a contempt order as a stay and solely within the discretion of the court that
imposed the original mandate).
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the first time on appeal, go beyond the record and import purgation into the decision-making process-in apparent contravention of what the Court of Appeals held impermissible at the appellate stage.3" While not completely contradictory, this second
line of appellate division authority does not appear consistent
with the bedrock proposition that criminal contempts may not be
settled by the parties to a litigation. 55
SECTION 38: PURGATION OF CIVIL CONTEMPTS

If a contemnor "should refuse to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a
conveyance required by a decree for specific performance, he
could be [imprisoned] until he complied with the order."5 ' Because the order of imprisonment seeks to coerce the defendant to
engage in the conduct commanded, the defendant holds the key
to his own jail cell.357 One who is fined, pursuant to an order of
civil contempt, has it in his power to avoid the penalty unless the

day for performance set by the court has passed. 351 With coercion
as its objective, civil contempt, by inescapable inference, is inappropriate where obedience is reasonably perceived not to be
within the capability of the contemnor. 59 Civil contempt incor3 60 Besides coerced acporates the factually impossible defense.
2'4 See Kuriansky v. Ali, 574 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 1991) (modifying, "in
the exercise of discretion," by eliminating the fine imposed and purging the contempt); see also People v. Williamson, 523 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (App. Div. 1988)
(rejecting contention that a right to a "purge order" exists, but importing appellate
discretion in modifying punishment); In re Additional 1979 Grand Jury of the Albany Sup. Ct. v. Jane Doe, 444 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (App. Div. 1981) (permitting a
criminal contemnor to purge the contempt by testifying before the grand jury); Ferrara v. Hynes, 404 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (App. Div. 1978) (permitting a contemnor to
purge criminal contempt by belatedly complying with a validly issued subpoena to
testify before the grand jury).
2 See Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 513
N.E.2d 706, 709-10 (N.Y. 1987) (per curiam) (rejecting parties' settlement proposing
withdrawal of a criminal contempt charge due to the serious nature of willful disobedience and "weighty public and institutional concerns regarding the integrity of
and respect for judicial orders").
"' Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442 (1911).
357 See id.
"'s See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947).
'59See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 67-69 (1948); Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1992); Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988).
"' See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983) (stating that a defendant, in a civil contempt proceeding, may assert the defense that it is presently
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tion or inaction, civil contempt also serves functions such as indemnity or remediative reparation.36 ' "Where a party is able to
show that he or she has suffered an actual loss or injury as a result of a civil contempt, a fine may be imposed in an amount sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party."3 6 2 The contemnor also
may be required to repair whatever damage he has caused. A
civil contempt fine need only be predicated upon a reasonable
basis of computation. 3 Distilled to the essence of its conceptual
distinction from criminal contempt, which is only supposed to
punish past disobedience, civil contempt is concerned only with
coercion and remediation or remediative reparation.3" Thus, a
civil contempt is purged by doing the act commanded or refraining from the act forbidden, paying money or taking other steps to
make an aggrieved litigant whole.
SECTION 39: CONTEMPTS AND EXECUTIVE PARDONS

The United States Constitution confers upon the President
3
the power to grant pardons for committing federal offenses. 6
Even at common law, however, the effect of a pardon was necessarily limited to the punishment imposed for a criminal conviction and had no effect as to the remedial portion of a court's order, because the remediation is necessary to secure the private
rights of a private suitor. 66 A pardon may, by logical necessity,
impossible to comply with the order).
36' See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 753(A)(B), 773 (McKinney 1992).
3'2 Wynard v. Beiny (In re Beiny), 562 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (App. Div. 1990),
amended by 576 N.Y.S.2d 501 (App. Div. 1991) (mem.).
363See id.
*" See IBM, Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1973); see also
McCain v. Dinkins, 639 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (N.Y. 1994) (upholding the imposition of
remedial fines against New York City to compensate homeless families for whom
the city failed to find proper shelter when ordered to do so by the court); Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. v. Deka Realty Corp., 620 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (App.
Div. 1995) (assessing civil contempt fines against a landlord in favor of his tenants
who had suffered actual damages due to housing code violations); First Natl Bank
of Glens Falls v. Reoux, 194 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (App. Div. 1959) (imposing a civil
contempt fine in the full amount of the judgment when the judgment debtor secreted funds causing an actual loss to the judgment creditor's administrator). But
see 4504 New Utrecht Ave. Corp. v. Pita Parlor, Inc., 531 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (App.
Div. 1988) (dismissing civil contempt fine because it was improperly invoked for the
nonpayment of a sum of money); N.A. Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Jones, 472 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366
(App. Div. 1984) (recognizing the possibility of imprisonment for a civil contempt so
as to coerce the party to perform the requisite act or duty and pay the fine).
s See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
'
See Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925).
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only be granted for a completed criminal contempt. 67 It may not
interfere with private rights or measures taken by the courts to
enforce those rights, such as coercive civil contempt. 36 Power to
pardon cannot take away the consequences of an act where private civil injustice is concerned. The President or Governor cannot pardon a husband/father who has been held in civil contempt
for failing to pay child support, or a tenant who has been held in
contempt for failure to pay his rent, or release an individual from
the provisions of a restraining order already violated. The pardon only obviates the conviction and the punishment for the offense; it does not erase the fact of its existence.3

69

Acceptance of

a pardon may imply a formal admission of guilt. 7 ° A pardon
based on an executive finding of innocence does not wipe out
guilt. The executive has no power to set aside a finding of guilt,
only to pardon.371 As with immunity from criminal prosecution,
the executive's pardoning power may not reach further than that
which the sovereign as sovereign-and as creature of constitution-may grant or withhold. 72 Under federal law, a presidential pardon may be granted before conviction for crime.73 Under

67

See id. at 121.

38 See id. See generally Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 258-59 (1974) (upholding
President's power to grant pardons conditionally); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
599 (1896) (stating, in dicta, that a witness may not invoke constitutional privilege
to avoid testifying before a grand jury when he has already received a pardon for the
offense); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866) (stating that it is beyond the power of Congress to impose punishment after an offender has been pardoned); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160-61 (1833) (rejecting defendant's contention that a presidential pardon for one conviction may be effective
against another indictment).
3' See In re
, an Attorney, 86 N.Y. 563, 568-73 (1881) (upholding disbarment of an attorney for a felony conviction, despite the fact that he had been
pardoned); see also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 111 N.E.2d 222, 224-26 (N.Y. 1953),
affd, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (upholding suspensions of doctors' licenses due to convictions of criminal contempt for refusing to produce documents subpoenaed by congressional committee); People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 38 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y.
1941) (upholding the sentence of a defendant as a "second offender" regardless of a
presidential pardon of the first offense). But see State v. Bergman, 558 N.E.2d 1111,
1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (ordering defendant's criminal record expunged after gubernatorial pardon); Commonwealth v. C.S., 534 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Pa. 1987) (same).
370 See Prisament,38 N.E.2d at 470 (citing Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S.
79, 90 (1915)).
371 See Prisament,38 N.E.2d at 470-71. But see Bergman, 58 N.E.2d at 1113.
372 See generally In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that a grant
of immunity to a testifying witness does not preclude private sanctions such as disbarment).
373 See In re Doyle, 177 N.E. 489, 497 (N.Y. 1931).
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New York's Constitution, a governor's pardon may only follow

conviction for crime."

Criminal contempt of court may be par-

doned. Civil contempts of court are beyond the pardoning
authority.
SECTION 40: SERIOUS AND PETTY CONTEMPTS
In determining entitlement to a jury trial, a serious nonpenal law criminal contempt is one which is punished with more
than six months in jail,"5 and not merely one which is punishable by more than six months in jail. It is the punishment ac-

tually imposed which is nunc pro tunc determinative.376 Quantitatively speaking, a serious nonpenal law criminal contempt fine
may, depending on the criminal contemnor, be somewhere between $10,000 and $52,000,000. 7 A line has not yet been and
may never be drawn. A criminal contempt fine of $10,000 may
be draconian to a homeowner with a family. A $1,000,000 fine is
picnic beer money to a multinational corporation. One suggestion might be an invitation requirement to a contemnor to submit his, her or its income tax return before the commencement of
a contempt proceeding in order to apply a principle of proportionality and assess whether a fine of a certain amount is serious

or petty."
374

See id. at 494.

See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (stating that criminal contempt is a petty offense unless punished as a serious one); see also Lewis v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2168 (1996) (acknowledging the uniqueness of criminal contempt charges as a valid exception to the no aggregate rule for petty crime potential
sentences, and for looking to actual instead of potential sentences); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968) (granting the right to jury trial in a criminal contempt case
imposing a 24 month sentence); People v. Foy, 673 N.E.2d 589, 590 (N.Y. 1996)
(holding that a potential aggregate sentence for petty crimes exceeding six months
does not in and of itself demand defendant be granted a jury trial); Morgenthau v.
Erlbaum, 451 N.E.2d 150, 156 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that despite "seriousness" of
prostitution charge, since it only carries a three month possible sentence a jury trial
cannot be granted); Rankin ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 242 N.E.2d 802, 807
(N.Y. 1968) (relying on Bloom and stating that contempt punishment of 30 days in
jail and $250 fine was not "serious" enough to warrant a jury trial). But see State ex.
rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1994) (expressly declining to follow Bloom).
3'6 See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (citing Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S.
506 (1974)); Foy, 673 N.E.2d at 589.
3' See International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821, 837 n.5 (1994) (citing Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975)).
378 See Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. v. Deka Realty, 620 N.Y.S.2d 837,
843-46 (App. Div. 1995) (suggesting that appellant could have introduced financial
376
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SECTION 41: THE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT "TRAP" DOCTRINE
A grand jury investigation seeks evidence of antecedent
crime,379 not the artificial creation of new crime during the course
of its proceedings-such as manipulating witnesses into committing contempt. In dicta, the Court of Appeals has coined the
phrase "contempt trap" to describe "an argument grounded, by
analogy, on the concept of a perjury trap."30 The court has also
held that a prosecutor "may not ...
attempt to trap the witness
into giving confusing or evasive replies."'81 Whether a questioner
has improperly sprung such a "contempt trap" on a witness ordinarily constitutes a factual question unless one is found to exist

as a matter of law.382
No one has a right to testify evasively or falsely." The Second Circuit has discussed but not adopted a peijury "trap" doctrine.3' Although a questioner controls the question, it is the
witness who controls the answer. What about a witness's intellect and free will?
SECTION 42: MULTIPLICITY AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

Indictment counts of criminal contempt are multiplicitous
when separate contempts are charged based on repeated refusals
to answer either the same questions or questions relating to one

records into evidence to support an argument that contempt fines imposed were
"serious").
See generally 38 AM. JUR. 2D Grand Jury § 28 (1968).
People v. Fischer, 423 N.E.2d 349, 351 n.1 (N.Y. 1981) (citing People v. Tyler,
385 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1978)).
'8 People v. Rappaport, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (N.Y. 1979) (citing Tyler, 385
N.E.2d at 1224).
32 See Fischer,423 N.E.2d at 351 n.1.
3' See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 568-70 (1976) (holding that
the failure to give Miranda warnings to a witness before the witness testifies is no
excuse for perjury); People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1978) (holding
that a defendant was not permitted to answer grand jury questions evasively); People v. Ianniello, 235 N.E.2d 439, 442 (N.Y. 1968) (stating that even though a witness
has "immunity," he may still be prosecuted for testifying evasively); People v.
Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580, 582 (N.Y. 1957) (holding recantation was not a defense
where the witness waited several days after testifying, and the witness was given
several opportunities to recant while still on the stand); see also United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 132 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the
Fifth Amendment gives witnesses the right to refuse to answer, but not the right to
testify falsely).
See United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Wheel
v. Robinson, 34 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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subject area." Are there distinct subject areas of inquiry? Is
there, objectively assessed and recognizable in advance, a scope
to the witness's refusal to answer?38 As for Judiciary Law
criminal contempt punishment arising out of grand jury proceedings, multiplicity does not arise when questioning occurs during
different sessions of the same grand jury or before different
grand juries.387 Judiciary Law punishment-far less punitive
than that imposed under a contempt indictment-does not confer
de facto immunity from later questioning of the same witness on
the same subject matter.3
SECTION 43: CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

While recalcitrant grand jury witnesses may be convicted
under the Penal Law or punished under the Judiciary Law, the
Federal Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the
imposition of both sanctions for the same criminal transaction.8 9
This does not appear to be the proverbial "last word." In United
States v. Dixon, the latest Supreme Court decision on the issue, a
38See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73 (1957) (stating that only one contempt charge would result when a witness fails to answer numerous questions concerning the same subject matter); see also Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 393
(1st Cir. 1972) (defining the scope of a witness' refusal to testify as within the same
subject matter and thereby subject only to one contempt charge).
s See People v. Riela, 166 N.E.2d 840, 843-44 (N.Y. 1960) (finding that the pattern of refusal was predictable); cf. People v. Saperstein, 140 N.E.2d 252, 257 (N.Y.
1957) (holding that poor memory as to one telephone conversation did not show that
the witness' memory would be equally poor as to the other separate conversations,
therefore the witness could not be held in contempt each time he failed to answer
questions of five separate telephone conversations).
387See People v. Dercole, 424 N.Y.S.2d 459, 469-70 (App. Div. 1980) (stating that
a defendant committed only one contempt when he refused to answer factually
similar questions which were asked within a short amount of time at a single session of a grand jury); see also Riela, 166 N.E.2d at 844 (same).
388
See People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of the City Prison, Brooklyn, 181 N.E.2d
424 (N.Y. 1962); Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 241 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App.
Div. 1963); Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 230 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (App.
Div. 1962), affd, 188 N.E.2d 138 (N.Y. 1963).
38 See Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9, 11 (1972); Colombo v. New York, 400
U.S. 16 (1970); People v. Colombo, 293 N.E.2d 247 (N.Y. 1972); People v. Colombo,
271 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1971); People v. Colombo, 302 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div.), affd,
254 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1969); Koota v. Colombo, 216 N.E.2d 568 (N.Y. 1966). Compare
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (holding contemnor did not waive double
jeopardy protection), with Williams v. State, 775 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. 1989)
(holding that double jeopardy did not bar an indictment for attempted capital murder when defendant had earlier been held in contempt and punished for the same
offense).
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badly splintered Court hardly achieved a coherent conclusion.
Specifically, the Court held that where a criminal contempt of
court does not have the "same elements" as a legislativelyenacted crime, a contempt proceeding followed by a criminal
prosecution does not implicate double jeopardy.3 °
SECTION 44: IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE CONTEMPT

Disorderly and insolently disruptive behavior which tends to
interrupt the court's proceedings or impair the respect due its
authority may occur in its presence but not in its immediate
view.39 ' It is the difference between assaulting a court officer
carrying out a court's directive and attempting to influence a juror in the cloakroom. Both are in the court's presence, but only
the former is in the court's immediate view and presence, and
permits summary punishment without advance notice; the latter
while in its presence is not in its immediate view. Such summary punishment derives less from the fact that the judge personally saw and heard the obstruction, but from the danger that
if immediate action is not taken, demoralization of the court's
authority and its capacity to conduct its proceedings will follow. 392 It is no surprise the Supreme Court has held that "[sluch

summary conviction and punishment accords due process of
law." 93 A court's power to punish contempt "is not controlled by
the limitations of the Constitution as to modes of accusation and
methods of trial generally safeguarding the rights of the citi3"o See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). ("The same elements
test, sometimes referred to as the "Blockburger" test, inquires whether each offense
[has any shared elements]; if [so], they are the 'same offence' and double jeopardy
bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.") (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. V). But see Shipley v. State, 620 N.E.2d 710, 717 n.2 (Ind. 1993) (holding
that in accordance with Indiana Supreme Court decisions, the "Blockburger" test
must be coupled with "the manner in which the offenses are charged and not merely
the statutory definitions of the offenses").
39'

See Exparte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889).

See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925); Ex parte Terry, 128
U.S. 289, 307-08 (1888). See generally Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798-800 (1987) (discussing the distinction between in-court and
out-of-court contempts, emphasizing that punishment of in-court contempt "serve[s]
the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court").
3" Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1949) ("[Flor direct contempts committed in the face of the court ... the offender may, in [the court's] discretion, be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and without other proof than its actual knowledge of what occurred.") (citing Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. at 313)).
32
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zen.""" New York's Appellate Division-First and Second Departments only-have rules governing immediate-view-andpresence summary contempt; 95 however, these rules are not
models of clarity because they mindlessly track the "hodgepodge"
of United States Supreme Court case law.3 The jurist would be
better served with Part C of the latest edition of The Benchbook
for TrialJudges.97
SECTION 45: EXAMPLES OF IMMEDIATE-VIEW-AND-PRESENCE
CONTEMPT

Calling a trial judge colorful epithets in the language of the
street in open court is an obvious form of immediate-view-andpresence contempt tending to obstruct proceedings and undermine the court's authority to preside over them.39 Brawling with
a court officer trying to carry out a court's directive is another
clear example.399 Unzipping one's trousers and urinating in front
of the judge and jury during the final phase of the prosecutor's
summation is yet another example which quintessentially combines disrespect with obstruction.4 " Other examples include refusal by a trial witness, absent privilege, to answer questions
when ordered to do so;401 advising a client in the presence of the
29 Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919); see also Cooke, 267 U.S. at 534
(stating that due process has not been violated when contempt in open court is
summarily punished despite lack of evidence or assistance of counsel before such
punishment); Katz v. Murtagh, 269 N.E.2d 816, 818-19 (N.Y. 1971) (citing the longstanding acceptance ofjudicial summary control over courtroom disorder).
3"' See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 604.2, 701.2 (1998).
39" Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 524 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-

ing).
in397 See COMMITT'EE ON PUBLICATIONS ASS1X OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., BENCH BOOK FOR TRIAL JUDGES-NEW YORK, at C-1 to
C-18. Part C governs conduct in the courtroom, including disruptive conduct, contempt, as well as sanctions. See id.
9,See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 710 (1964) (citing the Massachusetts Bay Charter, which provides fines for cursing in the presence of the judge).
"3 See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. at 289, 298 (judging summarily the petitioner
guil% of contempt for assaulting a U.S. Marshall during court proceedings).
See United States v. Perry, 116 F.3d 952, 957 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Perry urinated
on the carpet in open court and in plain view of [the judge].").
4
See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1975); In re Boyden, 675
F.2d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1982). The refusal to testify can involve many situations.
Under no circumstances is the refusal to testify justified. See id. For example, contempt has been found for failing to recall the subject matter of the question, when
the failure to recall was peijury. See In re Sinadinos, 760 F.2d 167, 171 (7th Cir.
1985) (discussing the three-part analysis of a witness's asserted memory loss); see
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court to disobey an order just issued to the client by the court;...
refusing to leave the courtroom;.. returning to the courtroom after being ejected for misbehavior;4 advancing towards a testifying witness and yelling "[y]ou are a damned liar";4. 5 deliberately
bringing witnesses back into the courtroom in defiance of an order excluding them;4 . and a defiant salute as part of a courtroom
demonstration.4 7
SECTION 46: IMMEDIATE-VIEW-AND-PRESENCE CONTEMNORS IN
CONTEMPT

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court-distilled
to some coherence-presently require that a court, during a jury
trial, adhere to the following exact steps in order to adjudicate
and punish an immediate-view-and-presence contemnor, and
have the adjudication sustained on appeal without prejudicing
also In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1983)
(refusing to testify by asserting the attorney-client privilege); People v. Pickett, 654
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that the court appropriately held a prosecution witness in contempt for feigning a lack of recall); O'Neil v. Kasler, 385 N.Y.S.2d
684, 691 (App. Div. 1976) (upholding criminal contempt charges for refusal to testify
after having been granted immunity); People v. Clinton, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (App.
Div. 1973) (holding that being in fear of one's own or one's child's life is not sufficient
reason for refusing to testify); People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789-90 (App.
Div. 1966) (upholding finding of contempt for refusing to testify on First Amendment grounds of the free exercise of religion), affd, 236 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1968)
(mem.).
402 See Davis v. Goodson, 635 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Ark. 1982) ("Although
an attorney has a duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in conduct
which offends the dignity of the court. An attorney may make a proper objection to a
ruling of the court but then should abide by the ruling so long as it remains in effect."). But see id. at 228 (Purtle, J., dissenting) ("If an attorney advises a client in
good faith even though that advice may be incorrect, he should not be held in criminal contempt of the court for doing what he feels is proper under the circumstances."); accord In re Watts and Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903); In re Landau, 243
N.Y.S. 732, 735-36 (App. Div. 1930).
403 See Rodriguez v. Feinberg, 369 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (App. Div.
1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 994, 995 (1976) (adjudging petitioners as guilty of criminal
contempt after their refusal to leave when the judge ordered them out of the courtroom).
See Gumbs v. Martinis, 338 N.Y.S.2d 817, 822 (App. Div. 1972) (sustaining
contempt charge for violating the judge's order to stay out of the courtroom).
'0
Gridley v. United States, 44 F.2d 716, 742, 734 (6th Cir. 1930).
40 See La Duca v. Bergin, 448 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1982)
(holding a
lawyer in contempt for his "vindictiveness" in violating the judge's order to exclude
certain witnesses from the courtroom).
407 See Katz v. Murtagh, 269 N.E.2d 816, 817-18 (N.Y. 1971) ("It is
enough that
by rising and raising his arm he joined the others in an unequivocal demonstration
40

of disrespect ....").
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the jury, and without violating the due process rights of the contemnor.
The court must direct the bailiff to "take the jury out" of the
courtroom and order the attorney, client, witness or spectator to
the bench. In direct language, the judge must tell the contemnor
that he or she is about to be held in contempt for obstructing or
immediately threatening to obstruct the court's proceeding or
impairing its authority over the proceeding. The judge is to ask
the contemnor if he or she has anything to say by way of explanation, defense, extenuation or mitigation. After hearing the
contemnor, the court may state that it finds the contemnor in
contempt, in its immediate view and presence, for engaging in
conduct that has obstructed or threatened to obstruct its proceedings or impaired its authority to preside over the proceedings. A brief statement of the facts, as seen and heard, are to be
written into the mandate of commitment, with punishment of
imprisonment and fine imposed immediately. When the mandate of commitment is filled out, execution of punishment is
stayed until the verdict or a declaration of mistrial. A stay is not
warranted for a disruptive spectator who was supposed to be a
completely silent non-actor in the courtroom in the first place.03
SECTION 47: JUDGE JEROME FRANK'S ANALYSIS

Summary punishment for courtroom contempt has "none but
a future effect."4" 9 The disruption has already occurred and
punishment can only stop it and deter future disruption. Those
who argue against a trial judge acting in hot blood simultaneously argue that if the judge awaits a cooler second thought, the
408 See Katz v. Murtagh, 269 N.E.2d 816, 817-18 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that court
proceedings were not so disrupted as to warrant a stay when a spectator was summarily adjudged in contempt). With respect to non-silent, active courtroom participants, see generally Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), and Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). But see Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163,
2167 (1996) (holding that a petty offense does not entitle a defendant to a jury trial,
and distinguishing criminal contempt from petty offenses on the basis that petty offenses are described in statute while contempt is not, and contempt is a unique exercise of judicial authority over its own proceedings); see also People v. Foy, 673
N.E.2d 589, 593 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that the petty offense itself and not the accumulation of petty offenses determines the constitutional entitlement to a grand
jurY).
j) United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 456 (2d Cir.
1950) (Frank, J., concurring), affd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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power to punish is extinguished because he or she no longer has
the necessity to justify it.41 However, Judge Frank's analysis
correctly points out that summary punishment is a legitimate
judicial necessity, and when a judge waits for a "chance to cool
off' before exercising the authority, he or she is better able to
pass summary judgment.41 '
SECTION 48: APPEALABILITY OF JUDICIARY LAW CONTEMPTS
Judiciary Law criminal contempt jurisprudence is a chameleon which has been shaped by decisions tailored to achieve desired results, and camouflaged as being required by law. Contempt's only enduring imperative seems to be necessity-a
mingled and confused jurisprudence by nomenclature. Regarding appealability and the scope of review, criminal contempt's
nature, character, form and overtones as variously expressed in
result-specific case law are only so much clay, available for
molding and defending a desired conclusion.
They provide
nothing of stable analytical substance concerning appealability.4 12 Twice, the New York State Legislature has been asked by
the courts to clarify whether Judiciary Law criminal contempts
are civilly appealable in the same fashion as Judiciary Law civil
contempts.4 3 Somehow, appeals under either label get to the
state Court of Appeals. There has been no legislative response.

SECTION 49: JUDICIARY LAW CONTEMPTS ARE NOT CRIMES
Before our state and federal constitutions were adopted, the
courts possessed contempt power. It was a by-product of being a
political institution which had the inherent power to preserve its
own existence without reliance on other political institutions.
Judiciary Law criminal contempts are neither civil nor crimi410

See id. at 456-59.

"'
412

Id. at 460.
See, e.g., Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9, 11 (1972); Blackmer v. United

States, 284 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1932); Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 218 N.E.2d 703, 704 (N.Y. 1965). See generally Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1987); Housing Dep't v.
Chance Equities, 515 N.Y.S.2d 709, 710-13 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1987) (denying respondent's demand for jury trial on contempt charge).
413 See People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y. 402, 406-07 (N.Y.
1882) ("[Ihf it is
best that there should be [appeals for criminal contempts] the attention of the legislature should be directed to the subject."); Hanbury v. Benedict, 146 N.Y.S. 44, 4748 (App. Div. 1914) (same).
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nal-as those terms are used in the language of the law. They
are sui generis special proceedings brought before the civil side
of a court possessed of civil and criminal jurisdiction, or, using
the civil forms, brought before courts possessed of only criminal
jurisdiction.414 "In brief, a court, enforcing obedience to its orders
by proceedings for contempt, is not executing the criminal laws
of the land."415 Although the United States Supreme Court has
stated that non-penal law criminal contempts are crimes "in the
ordinary sense,"416 this is not so and never will be so-no more
than Rome can say that the sun revolves around the earth.
Crimes "in the ordinary sense" are passed by legislatures. When
it desires a result, the Court will intone or seemingly disown this
catch phrase.4"7
SECTION 50: PRESIDING OVER A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING

Everyone wants perfect certainty. Jesuitical perfection is a
state of mind. Free-floating squeamishness is part of everyone
when called upon to pass judgment. A jurist presiding over a
criminal contempt proceeding under the Judiciary Law must
work with less than perfect certainty. A reasonable explanation
is an explanation that a reasonably prudent person would find
credible and acceptable. It is a question of whether common
human experience would lead a reasonable person to reject or
accept an explanation as reasonable. In litigation, civil or criminal, the fact-finder can never hope to ascertain the true, tranSee United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1941);
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 440-52 (1911); Bessette v. W.B.
Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327-30 (1904); McCormick v. Axelrod, 453 N.E.2d 508,
512 (N.Y. 1983); People v. Rappaport, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 1287-88 (N.Y. 1979); People
v. Leone, 376 N.E.2d 1287, 1288-89 (N.Y. 1978); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 489
N.Y.S.2d 914, 918-23 (App. Div. 1985); People ex rel. Frank v. McCann, 237 N.Y.S.
85, 88 (App. Div. 1929), affd, 170 N.E. 898, 899 (N.Y. 1930).
4'6 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 596 (1895); see also Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
335-36 (1977) (noting that the judiciary has a paramount interest in exercising its
contempt power free from state interference).
416 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
417 See International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821, 826 (1994) (determining that contempt is criminal in nature when it takes the
form of violating a court order by engaging in violence); cf Young v. United States
ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1987) (noting that the Court's "insistence on
the criminal character of contempt prosecutions has been intended to rebut earlier
characterizations of such actions as undeserving of the protections normally provided in criminal proceedings").
414
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scendental, absolute certainty. In the field of human factfinding, such is impossible. A fact-finder can only conclude what
probably has happened (preponderance of the evidence), what
highly probably has happened (clear and convincing evidence),
and what almost certainly has happened (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).418 For instance, document disappearance due to
sudden floods, lightning-induced fires, midnight burglaries and
car-trunk "break-ins" seem to follow what Judge Learned Hand
called "a well-known pattern" which "no sane person would believe." 19 According to the legendary jurist, "if courts allowed
themselves to be fobbed off with such silly tales, there would be
an end to the administration of justice."4 20
CONCLUSION
The New York contempt statutes are long overdue for review
and revision. By and large, they are of Thomas Jefferson vintage.42 1 The State's contempt jurisprudence is jurisprudence by
nomenclature. Case law of the United States Supreme Court
and the New York courts, particularly that of the state's appellate divisions, is often poorly crafted, poorly reasoned and simply
not thought through, with results as unpredictable as the
weather, and, unfortunately embarrassingly equally unjust.
Very often all of these tribunals ignore their own precedents
rather than overruling, explaining or distinguishing them.
The wisdom of correctly decided case law should be codified
by New York's Legislature into a new, brief, intelligible and
comprehensive statute with admonitions to the judiciary that its
418

See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 207 (1990) (discussing burdens of

proof in court proceedings); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 526.1 (1997) (discussing burdens of proof regarding federal sentencing guidelines).
419 Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F.2d 977, 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand,
J.).
420

Id.

See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 715 (1964) (stating that New
York's contempt law was enacted in 1829). New York's contempt law has caused judicial confusion for over a decade. See, e.g., People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer &
Terminer, 4 N.E. 259 (N.Y. 1886) (distinguishing between classes of contempts have
become "somewhat mingled and confused"); People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y.
402, 406 (N.Y. 1882) (urging legislative attention to clarify the appealability of
criminal contempt convictions); Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Bricklayers' & Mason
Plasterers' Intl Union, Local No. 45, 193 N.Y.S. 368, 369 (App. Div. 1922)
(acknowledging the "great confusion" surrounding contempt proceedings); Hanbury
v. Benedict, 146 N.Y.S. 44, 47 (App. Div. 1914) (concluding that the distinction between civil and criminal contempt has caused confusion).
421
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role is to apply the law, not reinvent it through amorphous interpretations. For their parts, New York's and the nation's judiciary must learn and then practice restraint by refraining from
importing their own notions of the good, the true and the beautiful into the law of contempt. This has been the hallmark of prior
decision-making which has made contempt law a mass of contradictions and anomalies. At least one justice of the United
States Supreme Court has referred to one facet of the Court's
contempt law jurisprudence as a "hodgepodge."4"
The high
Court's latest forays into contempt jurisprudence are assaults on
the human reasoning process." 3 Mindless appellate "judicial activism"-a euphemism for violating the judicial oath and engaging in official lawlessness-is decidedly unbecoming and counterproductive in the one area of law central to a civilized and
efficient justice system. Some common sense, together with
something other than knee-jerk "scholarship" from law clerksrecently referred to as "arrogant kids just out of law school' -would work to the ultimate benefit of all-including the same
appellate judiciary which constantly complains that it is as much
overloaded as it is disrespected for dispensing "junk justice."
Just this past term, the Court properly reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for holding that, in the context of an immediate-view-and-presence contempt, a lawyer's conduct was not
"so disruptive as to justify the use of summary contempt procedure.'42 This contemptibly ignorant ruling by the Ninth Circuit
would have introduced uncertainty into what should be a routine
practice in the conduct of a trial. So it has been,
at least, since
' 26
"the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. 0

42 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 524 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-

in)See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2165-66 (1996) (reinventing
Codispoti, 418 U.S. 506); see also International Union, United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Bagwell, 512 U.S, 821 (1994).
Michael W. McConnell, Supreme Humility, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at A14;
see also Tony Mauro, Justices Give Pivotal Role to Novice Lawyers, U.S.A. TODAY,
Mar. 13, 1998, at 1A (noting that tremendous power is placed in the hands of Supreme Court clerks "who lack self-assurance and experience" causing some decisions
to be "written in hairsplitting, tentative prose that leaves key issues unresolved").
42 Pounders v. Watson, 117 S. Ct. 2359 (1997) (rev'g Watson v. Block, 102 F.3d
433 (9th Cir. 1996)).
426 Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448, 457 n.6 (1st Cir.
1992) (quoting
Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Word, 131 F.2d 541, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1942)).
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